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ON THE USE OF ECONOMIC MODELS IN ANTITRUST:
THE REALEMON CASE
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE t
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is concerned with the appropriate use of economic
models in antitrust law. It does not attempt a comprehensive treat-
ment; nor does it offer definite proposals for change. Rather, after
a few general remarks on the current use of economic theory in anti-
trust, the discussion focuses on various aspects of a general failure
to exploit the power of economic analysis in antitrust litigation.
This failure is illustrated through consideration of the handling of
some economic issues in the Federal Trade Commission's recent
Initial Decision of Borden, Inc. ("ReaLemon"),1 a proceeding in-
volving Borden's ReaLemon Foods subdivision.
If antitrust law is to be at least partially concerned with efficient
resource use,2 any judgment, whether by court or commentator, that
some action should be found unlawful or some relief imposed in
any particular case must be based, at least partially, on some explicit
f Associate Professor of Applied Economics, Alfred P. Sloan School of Manage-
ment, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. B.S. 1965, Ph.D. 1970, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
In the course of writing this paper, I have been helped in important ways by
Victor Goldberg, Jerry Hausman, Paul Joskow, H. Michael Mann, Frederic M.
Scherer, Alvin Silk, Oliver Williamson, and, especially, Michael Glassman. However,
only I am responsible for any defects in the fnal product.
I (Initial Decision) No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976) ("ReaLemor'), reported in
[1976] 3 TRADE: REG. RE.P. (CCH) f 21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh.
No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978). ReaLemon is operated as part of Borden's Borden
Foods Division.
The Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge Hanscom was appealed to the
Federal Trade Commission; the briefs were filed in January 1977. After a prelimi-
nary version of this Article had been completed, the Federal Trade Commission
issued its opinion and order in this matter, along with two concurring opinions and
a separate opinion. Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7,
1978), reported in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
Because work on this paper had to be completed shortly thereafter, the central
discussion of this Article is limited to the Initial Decision.
Brief synopses of both the Initial Decision and the opinion of the Commission,
which have been summarized and reprinted in part, appear in the Trade Regulation
Reporter as indicated above. Complete copies are on file both at the FTC and
with the author.
2 The author finds persuasive the arguments of Bork and Posner that economic
efficiency should be the only objective of antitrust law. For a more extensive ex-
ploration of that viewpoint, see R. Bom, TAE ANTIrRUST PARAnOX 7-8 (1978);
R. Pos.xmn, AN rxmusT LAw 4, 8-22 (1976).
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or implicit model that predicts the effects of the action or relief
considered. Unless economic efficiency is held to be of no im-
portance, one can no more avoid the use of economic models in this
context than one can avoid speaking prose. One can, of course,
use an unsound or inappropriate model; the likelihood of doing this
must logically depend on the set of alternative models explicitly or
implicitly considered and on the methods used for choosing among
them.
Over the years, economic theorists have produced many models
of market behavior; generally, these have been designed to serve as
tools for the analysis of reality. The principles and methods em-
ployed in these theorists' studies can be used to produce new models,
either designed for general application to some class of situations
or tailored to fit the facts of a particular case. The industrial or-
ganization literature contains another set of models. These often
have their roots in rigorous microeconomic theory, but many are
equally dependent on empirical generalizations of various sorts.
The classical models of competition and monopoly are now only
two of a large number of more or less respectable economic models
that provide potential sources of information for antitrust policy-
makers.
If a model is to be used to make predictions about economic
effects, it ought to be both internally coherent, in the sense that its
predictions can be correctly deduced from its assumptions, and con-
sistent with the basic principles of economic analysis. Moreover,
the model's predictions should not conflict in important ways with
the facts at hand. If enough data of the right sort are available,
or if controlled experimentation is possible, at least in principle
one can select the best among a set of competing models entirely
on the basis of the accuracy of their predictions. In the analysis
of individual markets or business practices, this may not always be
possible, however, because several models may have predictions con-
sistent with the evidence available. In such cases one has little
choice but to look at the assumptions upon which competing models
rest. A model with assumptions that are in dramatic conflict with
the relevant facts should be rejected as a basis for decisionmaking
if its predictions cannot be shown to be superior to those of a com-
peting model of comparable complexity with more palatable as-
sumptions.
Students of economics generally learn that economic theory
provides a powerful, continually expanding set of tools for the
analysis of reality. They also learn that it is not easy to use these
1979]
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tools well. Because the literature contains a host of internally co-
herent models with different assumptions and implications, and be-
cause the methods of economic analysis can be used to construct new
models, analysis of any particular industry or behavior pattern may
pose difficult problems of model selection. Often such problems
can only be dealt with satisfactorily by creative theoretical analysis,
along with careful organization and evaluation of available evi-
dence. Students learn that unless one employs a coherent model
consistent with the principal facts at hand, it is very hard to defend
either predictions about the consequences of change or explanations
of observed behavior.
Economic theory does not seem to be employed by courts in
deciding antitrust cases in the way that students of economics are
taught to employ it. (On the other hand, economic theory is be-
coming better understood by enforcement agency personnel, who
are applying it with increasing frequency, at least when they decide
which cases to bring.) In antitrust decisions, the terminology of
economic theory is more often used to classify than to analyze. The
problem of selecting an internally coherent model consistent with
the facts is rarely addressed either directly or systematically. The
range of models or classifications discussed is often rather limited,
and the choice among them seems commonly to be based on a mix-
ture of intuition and the very careful application of simple rules of
doubtful generality. In short, economic theory as applied by the
courts is a rather different beast from economic theory as applied
by economists.
This fact is not always a cause for concern, of course. Areeda
may well be right when he asserts that "the economic background
necessary for understanding antitrust issues seldom requires de-
tailed mastery of technical refinements." 8 But his use of "seldom"
instead of "never" indicates, correctly in my view, that there are
cases in which "detailed mastery of economic refinements" is neces-
sary for understanding. Put another way, cases do arise in which the
economic issues are not straightforward, and in which neither intui-
tion nor elementary textbook models can be relied upon with con-
fidence. In such cases, economic theory as used by economists has
its greater potential for contributing to the development of antitrust
law and to the economic effects of antitrust litigation.
An intuitive feeling that standard approaches are omitting or
misrepresenting important aspects of the relevant reality should
serve to establish a presumption that explicit consideration of the
3 P. AMEEDA, ANTrMThST AN, ysis 5 (2d ed. 1974).
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model selection problem is warranted. Furthermore, the more
sharply the facts in any particular case depart from the assumptions
of textbook microeconomics, the less likely it becomes that attention
limited to textbook models is sufficient. Among other things, text-
book price theory assumes that markets are well-defined, that buyers
and sellers are well-informed, and, generally, that the offerings of
competing sellers are viewed by buyers as perfect substitutes. When
substitution relations are such that there is no object that cor-
responds well to the classical concept of a market, when buyers or
sellers lack important information, or when product differentiation
of one form or another is important, however, there is at least a
presumption that market behavior may not be well explained by
standard models.
Unless economics has somehow been on the wrong track for
the last two centuries, the economist's version of the scientific
method provides the best available approach to the analysis of
those economic issues that are not obvious-whether such issues
arise in the course of academic research or in an antitrust case. In
order to use the economist's approach, one must be prepared
thoughtfully to apply the tests of internal coherence and consistency
with evidence to competing economic models and to rely on the
implications of the model that emerges from that selection process,
even if that model cannot be found in a textbook.
The following discussion illustrates the above points through
an analysis of the handling of economic questions in the Initial De-
cision of ReaLemon,4 in which Federal Trade Commission Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Daniel H. Hanscom concluded that Borden's
ReaLemon Foods subdivision had monopolized the processed lemon
juice market. The next section of this Article outlines the facts
of that case.5 Sections III through V consider three issues important
to that case and others like it: market definition and its role in the
analysis of market power, tests for predatory pricing, and the design
of appropriate remedies. Section VI provides a few summary re-
marks.
4 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in [1976]
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ff21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Adv.
Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
5 Unless otherwise specified, the facts related in this Article are taken from
Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in [1976]
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 721,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh.
No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978). Submissions of complaint counsel or respondent are
relied upon only for elaboration of points either not at issue or left unresolved by
the Initial Decision.
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II. THE ReaLemon CASE
In 1935 Irvin Swartzberg began bottling lemon juice in
his basement and selling it in Chicago.6 He began using the
"ReaLemon" trademark in the mid-1940's. The business grew
rapidly, and in 1962 Swartzberg's company, ReaLemon-Puritan, was
acquired by Borden, which paid $12.4 million for net assets with a
book value of $2.8 million.7 Borden's books thus showed a $9.6
million "goodwill" asset for this operation.
If one defines nationwide sales of either processed lemon juice 8
or reconstituted lemon juice 9 as the relevant market, ReaLemon
brand reconstituted lemon juice maintained about a ninety percent
share through the 1960's. On the other hand, if the market defini-
tion is expanded to include fresh lemons, ReaLemon's historic
share would drop to about thirty percent on a gallon basis and
about ten percent on a dollar basis.10
After 1952, Sunkist brand reconstituted lemon juice apparently
achieved a fairly wide distribution.1 During this period, ReaLemon
charged a lower list price in the eastern United States than else-
where; the stated purpose of this policy was "to more closely meet
the Sunkist price" there.12 In 1958, Sunkist cut back its reconsti-
tuted lemon juice operation because of the "highly competitive"
situation it faced; it now sells only in the Southwest.13 ReaLemon
was the only brand of processed lemon juice in national distribution
6 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent 22-23,
Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in [1976]
3 TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) ff 21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE REc. RPa,. (CCH) Adv. Sh.
No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
7Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 59 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TRADE REc. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
s Processed lemon juice includes all lemon juice except that which is sold in the
form of fresh lemons. Id. 6.
9 For a description of the technology involved in manufacturing reconstituted
lemon juice, see text accompanying notes 18-19 infra.
10 In 1973, for example, the total sales of reconstituted lemon juice in the
United States were about $25 million, while sales of fresh lemons totaled about $200
million. Id. 2, 6. If these two markets were combined, ReaLemon's approximate
80% dollar share (in 1973), id. 56, would fall to about nine percent of the total
dollar sales of the combined lemon market. On a per ounce basis, ReaLemon sold
for about one-quarter of the price of juice from fresh lemons in the early 1970's,
although this figure varied considerably over time. Id. 17. Thus, an 80% share of
reconstituted lemon juice sales in ounces would translate to about a 27% share of the
larger market.
'Id. 78.
12 Id. 99.
i1 Id.
[Vol. 127:994
ECONOMIC MODELS IN ANTITRUST
during the 1960's, and it was the only brand to which advertising
in more than trivial amounts was devoted. ReaLemon's advertis-
ing/sales ratio was apparently not unusually high, however.14
If one ignores the "goodwill" asset mentioned above, the rate
of return on assets for Borden's ReaLemon Foods subdivision (the
principal product of which was ReaLemon brand reconstituted
lemon juice, which accounted for seventy-five percent of its rev-
enue) 15 averaged about 3.3 times that of the Food and Kindred
Products aggregate for 1963-1973, and about 4.4 times that bench-
mark return for 1968-1973. If ReaLemon's assets are augmented
by the "goodwill" it carried on its books, these multiples fall to
about 1.5 and 1.7, respectively.' 6
In 1969 Golden Crown Citrus Corporation was a Chicago-based
firm engaged primarily in the home delivery of fruit juices in the
Chicago area.' 7 Golden Crown was in some financial distress. New
top management, with no experience in retail distribution, decided,
without doing any detailed market studies, to begin selling recon-
stituted lemon juice to supermarkets.' 8 It encountered no technical
problems. Indeed, all parties apparently agreed with Judge Hans-
corn's description of the technology involved:
Reconstituted lemon juice is manufactured by adding
water, a preservative or preservatives, and lemon oil to
pure lemon juice concentrate which is purchased in bulk,
often in tank cars, by large producers such as Borden.
The ingredients are mixed according to a simple, well-
known formula, using uncomplicated, relatively inexpen-
'4 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent 111,
Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in [1976]
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) f 21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Com'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE BEe. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh.
No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
l Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 4 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
16 Complaint Counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order 33-34, Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in
[1976] 3 TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) f[ 21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv.
Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
'7 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 78 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
is Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent 107-09,
Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in [1976]
3 TaDnE BEe. Rep. (CCH) ff21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Commn), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh.
No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
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sive equipment of the sort employed by any juice bottling
operation.' 9
Golden Crown did find, as had all other regional producers,
that in order to induce grocers to stock its product and consumers
to buy it, its price had to be well below ReaLemon's. It priced
accordingly, apparently making some sales at prices below any rea-
sonable definition of cost. Golden Crown grew rapidly after 1969.
Because most grocers seemed willing to carry no more than two
brands of reconstituted lemon juice, ReaLemon and a low-priced
brand, Golden Crown's initial gains came at the expense of other
small producers.
By 1971, however, ReaLemon's management had begun to con-
sider Golden Crown a force to be reckoned with. This perception
was apparently correct. Golden Crown entered the East in 1970,
the Northeast in 1971, the Southeast in 1972, and the West and
Southwest in 1973. In 1973 Golden Crown also acquired a second
production facilitity, this one in New Jersey.20 (ReaLemon had
plants in Chicago, New York, and California.) Golden Crown's
gallon share of processed lemon juice sales rose from virtually zero
in 1969 to about fifteen percent in 1974; 21 most of these sales were
made in the northeastern portion of the country.22 Over this same
period, ReaLemon's national share fell from around ninety percent
to about seventy-five percent.
After 1969, ReaLemon's list prices were lower in areas in which
it faced the most intense competition from Golden Crown and
others. (List prices had been the same in all regions of the United
States in 1967 and 1968.) ReaLemon's 1971-1974 marketing plans
reveal a concern with this "low-priced" competition and an inten-
tion to use selective discounts off list price (generally in the form
of promotional allowances) to deal with it. The 1973 plan an-
nounced the objective of regaining half of ReaLemon's 1971-1972
share loss, which amounted to about four percentage points on a
gallon basis.23 The company intended to achieve this goal pri-
19Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 7 (Aug. 19, 1978),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TRADE .EG. RaP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
20 ld. 79.
211d. 134-35.
22 In early 1973, about 55% of Golden Crown's sales were made in the New
York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit areas; by contrast, about 38% of ReaLemon's
sales were made in these areas. Id. 91.
23 Id. 85, 87.
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marily by offering selective discounts in key areas. In fact,
ReaLemon's share fell by another three points in 1973. The 1974
marketing plan called for an increase in list price, but only in
areas not much affected by Golden Crown, as well as an increase in
advertising, and discounting in areas in which Golden Crown was a
factor.2
The lowest net prices evidently were paid by the leading grocery
chains in Philadelphia and Buffalo, both of which purchased sub-
stantial numbers of twelve-quart cases of ReaLemon for $4.05 in
December, 1973.25 (Other stores in these areas paid $4.20 or
more.) 28 On the basis of documents from ReaLemon's files for
this period, complaint counsel charged that these prices were below
ReaLemon's average variable cost. The judge, however, accepted
average variable cost estimates, prepared subsequently, of $3.83 per
case for Philadelphia and $3.75 for Buffalo.2 7 He thus found that
these sales, and all of ReaLemon's other sales, had been made at
prices above average variable cost. He did point out, however,
that
[t]he $4.05 per case price is close to ReaLemon's national
average per case cost on a direct shipment basis. This cost
appears to have been the only data available to Borden
management at the time the subject sales were made....
Thus, at the time of the sales in question, Borden either
failed to consider its cost before agreeing to the low sale
prices, or knew that it was selling very dose to the cost
figures reflected in the data that [were] then available to
it.28
ReaLemon estimated Golden Crown's average total costs as of
the end of 1972 for these markets at $3.74 per case; Golden Crown's
estimate as of the end of 1973 was $4.00. After receiving the dis-
counts mentioned in the preceding paragraph, both chains sold
ReaLemon at $.39 per quart.29 With twelve quarts per case, this
24 The 1974 marketing plan's stated objective was the reduction of Golden
Crown's share of the market in the four areas mentioned in note 22 supra, from
18% to 14%, and an increase of ReaLemon's share from 71% to 75%. Id. 91-92.
Several other documents also introduced into evidence indicate that ReaLemon in-
tended to reduce Golden Crown's market share (and to increase its own) in various
areas, and thereby to impair Golden Crown's ability to expand into new areas.
ReaLemon sought to accomplish this objective mainly by offering selective discounts.
25 Id. 128-29.
26 Id. 130.
27 Id. 128, 130.
28 I& 130.
29 Id. 109, 113. By comparison, ReaLemon retailed nationwide at an average
of just over $.60 per quart in early 1973. Id. 89.
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gave the Philadelphia chain a markup of almost fifteen percent.
In this price range, grocers testified that Golden Grown would have
had to be between ten and fifteen cents cheaper at retail in order
to avoid drastic sales losses.30 Assuming the same grocer markup,
this would require Golden Crown to wholesale at between $2.50 and
$3.00 per case, well below ReaLemon's average variable cost 31 and
Golden Crown's average total cost. If, as seems to have been the
case, grocers demanded larger margins on Golden Crown, it would
have had to sell for even lower prices in order effectively to meet
ReaLemon's price. The central reason for this situation, of course,
was the "premium brand" status of ReaLemon; Golden Crown
simply could not sell its product unless it offered grocers a sub-
stantial discount below the ReaLemon price, even though the two
products were virtually identical.
3 2
Golden Crown complained about ReaLemon's pricing to the
Chicago regional office of the Federal Trade Commission. After
conducting an investigation, the Commission filed a complaint
against Borden, Inc., in July 1974.33 Late in 1974, the assets, name,
and business of Golden Crown were acquired by a subsidiary of the
Seven-Up Corporation. A successor to Golden Crown, G.C. Citrus,
retained some of Golden Crown's liabilities and received a cash
payment from Seven-Up. At the time of this purchase Golden
Crown's liabilities exceeded its assets by about $1 million.
Subtracting Seven-Up's cash payment from the Golden Crown lia-
bilities assumed by G.C. Citrus yields a net liability of around
$600,000. Thus, Seven-Up paid about $400,000 for Golden Crown's
"goodwill."34 By comparison, Golden Crown had lost about $500,000
on its operations in the preceding fiscal year.
30 d. 133.
31 See id. 128, 130.
32 Complaint Counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order 103-04, Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported
in [1976] 3 T.ADE Rrn. REP. (CCH) ff 21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of
the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv.
Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
33 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 1-2 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TnA.E REG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
34 This amount does not include contingent payments of up to $1.75 million
that Seven-Up was to make to G.C. Citrus if returns on Golden Crown exceeded
certain thresholds. As of September 1978, Seven-Up was still marketing Golden
Crown reconstituted lemon juice. Complaint Counsel's Answering Brief in Response
to Appeal Brief of Borden, Inc., and in Support of the Initial Decision of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge 25-26, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov.
7, 1978), reported in TRJADE RE. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27,
1978).
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Trial of this matter began in May 1975 and was completed in
February 1976. The Initial Decision was made in August 1976.
In it the administrative law judge found that Borden had violated
the law:
Respondent Borden, Inc., possesses, and has possessed, a
monopoly position and monopoly power in the processed
lemon juice market, and has unlawfully engaged in acts
and practices with the purpose and intent, and with the
effect, of preserving and maintaining that monopoly posi-
tion and power, and has unlawfully hindered, restrained
and prevented competition in the production, marketing
and sale of processed lemon juice in violation of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.35
The proscribed acts and practices included ReaLemon's policies of
maintaining different list prices and promotional allowances (dis-
counts) in different regions of charging different net prices to dif-
ferent individual customers, and of making sales at "unreasonably
low prices." 36 Borden was ordered to license the ReaLemon trade-
mark, at royalty rates designed to cover only the cost of quality con-
trol, to all comers for a period of ten years.37  Judge Hanscom
also ordered Borden to cease and desist from charging different
prices to competing buyers, selling at unreasonably low prices, and
granting promotional allowances, "the effect of which is to hinder,
restrain or eliminate competition between respondent Borden and
its competitors in the production, marketing, and sale of processed
lemon juice." 38
Of the 204 findings of fact in the Initial Decision, sixty-four
were concerned with the question whether processed lemon juice
was a valid market; the alternative was to include fresh lemons
in the market. A similar allocation of effort to this issue is re-
35 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 162 (Aug. 19, 1976)
(citing Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976)), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE BEG. Rn'. (CCH) Adv. Sh.
No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
3 6 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 98, 100, 105, 117, 134.
371d. 167-68.
38 Id. 169-70. The opinion of the Commission basically followed the Initial
Decision except with respect to the question of relief. Borden, Inc. (Opinion of
the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TAADE REG. BEP. (CCH) Adv.
Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978). The Commission declined to order trademark
licensing, id. 40, but it did enjoin "any price discrimination, not justified by cost
differentials, that adversely affects competition," id. 38. The Commission thus
prohibited price discrimination regardless of whether customers compete in the same
geographic area.
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flected in the various documents filed by complaint counsel and
Borden after the close of the trial. The question of market defini-
tion, along with the basic reason for its perceived importance in this
case-the light it presumably shed on the question of ReaLemon's
market power-is discussed in the next section of this Article.
A second key issue in this case was whether ReaLemon's pric-
ing established monopolization. In section IV this topic is con-
sidered in light of recent suggestions regarding predatory pricing,
and in light of demand conditions in this market.
Finally, the relief ordered in the Initial Decision was somewhat
novel and has been the subject of considerable discussion. Some
of the economic aspects involved in trademark licensing are con-
sidered in section V, which emphasizes the importance of under-
standing the special features of the situation considered.
III. MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER
All parties involved in the ReaLemon litigation seem to have
attached substantial importance to the definition of "the relevant
market." Nothing in the antitrust statutes compelled this concern;
those laws do not even mention markets. Nevertheless, the reason
for the perceived importance of market definition in this case is
clear: if "the relevant market" had been held to include fresh
lemons along with processed lemon juice, ReaLemon's market share
would have been below the minimum levels associated in the case
law with the possession of monopoly power. 89 Only if ReaLemon
had been held to have monopoly power would the court have
reached the question whether that power had been unlawfully ex-
ercised or maintained.
This section will demonstrate that the standard market share
approach to the measurement of monopoly power is inherently
incapable of providing definite answers to the relevant economic
questions in the ReaLemon case, even though both sides apparently
assumed that it could do so. It is useful to begin with a general
discussion of monopoly power and its measurement. After an
analysis of the properties of the market share approach in this con-
text, this section concludes with a discussion of the measurement of
monopoly power in ReaLemon.
89 The standard citation for this proposition is Learned Hand's famous dictum.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (The Alcoa Case), 148 F.2d 416, 424
(2d Cir. 1945), cited in Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 151
(Aug. 19, 1976), modified, Borden, Inc, (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov.
7, 1978), reported in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27,
1978).
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There are two rather different forms of monopoly power:
short-run and long-run power. Although this distinction is im-
portant to economists, it often seems to be overlooked by judges
deciding antitrust case law.40 As the Initial Decision notes, "Mo-
nopoly power has long been defined [by the courts] as the power
to control prices or unreasonably restrict competition." 41 This
usage suggests that monopoly power is a force that, like electricity,
can be employed to perform a variety of unrelated tasks. In fact, a
firm may have the short-run power to control prices without any
long-run ability to restrict competition. Wilkinson Sword, for ex-
ample, was the only seller of coated, stainless steel, double-edged
razor blades in the United States for a relatively short time. During
that period, it presumably had some control over the price of its
output; but the subsequent, effective entry of other firms into the
market shows that Wilkinson Sword actually had little ability to
restrict competition.42 Similarly, a patent that lowers the cost of
making paper will not by itself give its holder any ability to control
the price of paper; but it will provide the power to protect profits
from new competition.4 3 The power to control prices derives from
the ability to make output changes large enough to have a notice-
able impact on buyers, whereas the power "unreasonably [to] re-
trict competition" in the long run must derive from some advantage
over actual or potential competitors that inherently serves this pur-
pose, or can be exploited to do so.
In all economic models of which I am aware, the statement that
a firm has short-run monopoly power is equivalent to the statement
that the firm's optimal price is above its marginal cost. On the
basis of this test, most firms have some short-run monopoly power,
and most groups of competing firms have potential monopoly power,
40 The difference between the long-run and short-run forms of monopoly power
is at the core of Mason's famous distinction between the legal and economic mean-
ings of monopoly. The former, which stresses the power to exclude rivals, corre-
sponds to what is called here long-run monopoly power; the latter, which focuses
on market structure at any instant, corresponds to short-run power over price. See
Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 37-38, 44 (1937).
41 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 151 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comnn'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TRADE Ee. BRP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
42 According to A.M. Paxton, Wilkinson Sword's Product Manager of Shaving,
Wilkinson Sword was the only producer of coated, stainless steel, double-edged
razor blades in the United States "briefly" from 1961 to 1962, and in the United
Kingdom from 1961 to 1963.
43 Bain regards the control of superior production techniques through patents
as a principal source of absolute cost advantage. It is one of his major categories
of barriers to entry. J. Bar, BAmus TO NEW CoMiPETIO N 144, 148 (1956).
See note 57 infra.
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in the sense that their optimal collusive or cartel policy would in-
volve setting price above marginal cost.44 As a practical matter,
however, antitrust law cannot be concerned with all deviations
from perfection but only with important deviations.
The obvious test for the existence and significance of short-run
monopoly power involves comparing prices and marginal costs: if
price exceeds marginal cost by an appreciable margin, non-trivial,
short-run monopoly power is present. But it is notoriously difficult
to define and quantify marginal cost with any precision.
A second approach is suggested by standard microeconomic
theory. Suppose, for purposes of discussion, that ReaLemon were
the only seller of processed lemon juice in the country. Because the
evidence clearly indicates that neither fresh lemons nor any other
product is a perfect substitute for processed lemon juice,45 it would
be sensible to think of ReaLemon as facing a downward sloping
demand curve at any instant. Given these considerations, an econ-
omist would be likely to invoke the standard formula for monopoly
equilibrium in analyzing ReaLemon's short-run monopoly power:
(1) (P - MC)/P = 1/E
where P is price, MC is marginal cost, and E is the absolute value
of the price elasticity of demand.
The quantity on the left of equation (1) is Lerner's measure of
the degree of monopoly.46 As was mentioned above, it may be dif-
ficult to estimate marginal cost directly.47 Equation (1) indicates
that this problem can be avoided, under the above assumptions, by
estimating the elasticity of demand for processed lemon juice.48
Various items of evidence cited in the Initial Decision indicate that
E is finite,49 because there are apparently no perfect substitutes for
44 For a discussion of the operation of collusive pricing arrangements, see
F. Sci-RER, INDUSTRIAL MARxET SRucvuRE; AND EcoNoMIC FOcxo scE 158-64
(1970).
45 See Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 8-10 (Aug. 19,
1976), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in TRADE BEc. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
46 See Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly
Power, 1 REv. EcoN. SvuD. 157 (1934).
47 See text following note 44 supra.
48 For a discussion of demand elasticity estimation as an alternative to market
definition, see R. PosNE, supra note 2, at 125.
49 See Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 8-16 (Aug. 19,
1976), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in TRADE REG. REPa. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
E will only be infinite when perfect competition prevails and each producer
can sell as much or as little as it wants without affecting market price. J. ROBINSON,
EcoNOmicS OF IMPERFECT COMPTInION 18 (2d ed. 1969).
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processed lemon juice in the short run; however, it is not clear that
this estimate can be refined to any great extent. If prices have not
varied enough, historical data may not contain information from
which reliable estimates of E can be derived; and in most situations
this elasticity may vary with both the level of price charged and
the length of time over which buyer response to price changes is
measured. The actual situation in ReaLemon involved a further
complication. The quantity "E," as defined in the textbooks, mea-
sures the sensitivity of demand for a firm's product to changes in the
firm's own price, assuming that all other prices in the economy
remain constant. Changes in ReaLemon's price, however, might
have induced changes in the prices of other brands of processed
lemon juice, and perhaps even in the price of fresh lemons. If
these prices affected the demand for ReaLemon's output, the price
elasticity of demand relevant to ReaLemon's decisionmaking must
have reflected its expectations about the changes in competitors'
prices that ReaLemon's actions would provoke and its assumptions
about the effects of those changes on the demand for ReaLemon's
product. Expectations of this sort may be a major determinant of
the markup over marginal cost actually selected, but they cannot
be readily measured by an outside observer.
There is a third quantity that can shed light on the existence
and importance of short-run monopoly power: the level of excess
profits. 0 If, for example, unit costs are constant, so that marginal
cost equals average cost (including a normal return on capital),
multiplication and division of the left side of equation (1) by the
number of units sold shows that the ratio of excess profit (or mo-
nopoly rent) to sales revenue equals 1 /E in monopoly equilibrium.
In general, the presence of substantial excess profits may reflect im-
portant short-run monopoly power; but such profits do not neces-
sarily imply power, because purely competitive firms can receive
excess profits in short-run disequilibrium.51 Moreover, it is not
always a trivial matter to penetrate the fog of accounting convention
50 These excess profits may also be termed "monopoly rent." Rent in the
economic sense is "a surplus earned by a particular part of a factor of production
over and above the minimum earnings necessary to induce it to do its work."
J. ROHMSOr, supra note 49, at 102.
51 Similarly, short-run monopoly power need not imply excess profits, because
one can have an ironclad monopoly over something that nobody will buy unless its
price is below production cost. Although a profits test will not detect such situa-
tions, this fact creates no great problem: to reduce the short-run monopoly power
of a firm earning no excess profit is to drive it from the market. This result can
create a net efficiency loss because it deprives buyers of a product not available
elsewhere. See Sebmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal
Industry, 9 BELL J. EcoN. 305, 319-21 (1978), and references cited therein.
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and estimate accurately the magnitude of excess profit5 2  Still, in-
formation on the level of profits being earned, coupled with an analy-
sis of alternative explanations for excess profits, if detected, can shed
considerable light on the importance of short-run monopoly power.
Although there are serious measurement problems, they generally
are less severe than those encountered in estimating marginal cost
or demand elasticities. 53 The main weakness of this approach is
that even if excess profits are found to exist, further analysis is
required before one can conclude that they reflect short-run monop-
oly power.
Long-run monopoly power that is worth having and that is
likely to be an issue in antitrust proceedings must permit a firm or
group of firms to protect excess profits from competitive erosion. 4
Thus, one consequence of significant long-run monopoly power is
the persistence of short-run monopoly power, which in turn should
be reflected in persistent excess profits.55 The persistence of sub-
stantial excess profits generally indicates the presence of some ob-
stacle to effective competition; but not all such obstacles stem from
the exercise of the power to exclude or restrain rivals.5" The de-
veloper of a highly profitable new liquor that requires long aging,
for example, may enjoy a substantial period of high profits before
rivals' products are ready to be marketed. Similarly, a firm with
extraordinary cost advantages over all actual or potential rivals may
continue to earn excess profits over a long period of time.
Following Bain,57 it has become standard practice to refer to
obstacles to effective competition that serve to preserve excess profits
5 2 "One would expect highly profitable firms to be more prone to select account-
ing rules that understate their profits for both tax and public relations purposes"
and relatively unprofitable firms to exaggerate profits in order to "stave off angry
stockholders and raiders." Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Anti-
trust, in nus=NURAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEABNING 184, 197 (1974).
53 For a discussion of some of the measurement problems with the excess profits
analysis, see id. 196-201. Weiss notes that a great deal of empirical work simply
takes accounting profitability as a measure of exercised monopoly power.
54 It is also possible for an unprofitable firm to have the power to exclude new
competition. This power will never become visible, however, because low profits by
themselves would serve to discourage potential entrants.
55 "[P]rofit figures can therefore distinguish monopolistic from competitive situa-
tions at best only when they pertain to periods in which long-run equilibrium is
approximated." F. ScHERER, supra note 44, at 50.
56 Excess profits might "be attributable to rapidly growing demand for the
industry's product or, for a particular firm, superior production resources or man-
agerial skill";, but "such competitive explanations become less likely as the period
of high profits is more prolonged." P. Aax_.mA, supra note 3, at 38.
57 Bain maintains that barriers to entry arise from three main sources: (1) abso-
lute cost advantages of established firms; (2) product differentiation advantages of
established firms; and (3) significant economies of large-scale firms. J. BAn, supra
note 43, at 14.
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as "barriers to entry," 5s although as Caves and Porter have recently
emphasized, 9 such obstacles can affect established sellers as well as
actual or potential new entrants. Almost as a matter of definition,
such obstacles must rest on some long-lived advantage over rivals.60
Sometimes a firm may obtain such an advantage merely by being
the first to engage in a particular activity, as is the case when cost
and demand conditions permit only one seller to operate profitably,
although this is by no means a universal occurrence. Similarly, some
obstacles may serve by themselves to prevent profit erosion, thereby
making it unnecessary for the firm to modify its policies in the in-
terests of restricting competition.61 But this is not universally the
case either: in some instances explicit acts or practices aimed at
actual or potential rivals may be necessary to preserve profits. When
such actions are taken, it becomes meaningful to speak of the exer-
cise of long-run monopoly power. On the other hand, if comped-
don can be sufficiently restricted (so that excess profits are not
threatened) without the need to focus attention on other firms, it is
still sensible to speak of the possession of long-run monopoly power,
but it is not clear what one might mean by its exercise. In any
case, although persistent excess profits strongly suggest the existence
of long-run monopoly power, further analysis is required to de-
termine the source of that power and the manner in which it has
been exercised, if at all. 2
It is now appropriate to ask what, if anything, market share can
indicate about monopoly power. As the foregoing discussion should
make dear, both short-run and long-run monopoly power are log-
ically continuous variables, in the sense that they can take on a
whole range of values.63 The questions about monopoly power that
usually interest economists involve its sources and importance, rather
than its existence. Courts, on the other hand, often seem to treat
the existence and importance of monopoly power as though they
58 Id.
59 Caves & Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 241
(1977).
60 Bain states that "conditions of entry" may be roughly evaluated "by the
advantages of established sellers in an industry over potential entrant sellers, these
advantages being reflected in the extent to which established sellers can -persistently
raise their prices above a competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the
industry." J. BAiN, supra note 43, at 3 (emphasis added). Bain deliberately in-
serted the term "persistently" in his definition of the condition of entry in order to
emphasize the long-term aspect of this concept Id. 7.
61 See id. 20-25.
62 For an example of this type of analysis, see Schmalensee, supra note 51, at
63 See P. AnEDA, supra note 3, at 203.
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were equivalent. Similarly, the term "market" is used somewhat
differently in economics than in antitrust law. In their activities
in areas other than antitrust, economists make frequent theoretical
and empirical use of the concept of a market, but they devote rela-
tively little effort to attempting precise market definitions.
Students of economics learn that a perfect market requires per-
fectly informed buyers and sellers, with all buyers correctly regard-
ing all sellers' wares as perfect substitutes. A single price prevails
in such a market, and it usefully summarizes a vast amount of in-
formation. Students also learn that perfect markets are rare, though
for many purposes it is useful to aggregate imperfect substitutes and
treat them as contained in a single market. As long as the goods
or services 'thus aggregated are close enough substitutes, their prices
will move together, and an appropriate price index can thus serve
as a useful summary statistic. The critical point here is that the
appropriate degree of aggregation depends almost entirely on the
question to be analyzed. Thus, the leading basic textbook can deal
with the market for new electrical engineers in one context and the
market for labor in another, with no inconsistency at all.64 The
first definition permits one to examine the relative wage of engi-
neers, while the second can be used to analyze the general level of
wages. If the question to be answered calls for markets to be de-
fined narrowly, of course, close substitutes (or complements) may be
excluded. As long as markets are separated by a noticeable "gap in
the chain of substitutes," 65 this exclusion poses no real problem:
the appropriate model may involve several markets linked together
by supply or demand behavior.66 Yet, models involving several
linked markets have never been explicitly considered in antitrust
decisions.
Suppose, for the moment, there exists a perfect market in which
several firms produce identical products. Suppose further that this
market can be analyzed in isolation. That is, assume that dis-
turbances in this market do not cause changes elsewhere in the
economy that feed back and shift demand and cost schedules in the
original market.67 Under these classical assumptions, market share
64 Compare P. SAMULsoN, ECONOICS 70 (10th ed. 1976) with id. 573.
65 The phrase is Joan Robinson's. See J. ROBINSON, supra note 49, at 5. As a
practical matter, economists usually look for such gaps in framing market definitions,
but they rarely pay explicit attention to the size of the gaps in any particular
situation.
66 For a discussion of some of these issues, see K. LANcASTER, INTRODUC-TON
To MoDmN MicnoEcoNOmics 43-56 (2d ed. 1970).
67 This assumption requires that the market be small relative to the whole
economy and that no important close substitutes or complements exist.
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may serve as a partial indicator of the extent of short-run monopoly
power.
The analysis goes as follows. Because all sellers' outputs are
perfect substitutes, any seller that reduced price a penny below the
prevailing market price would receive the entire market demand,
and any seller that priced a penny above the market price would sell
nothing. This suggests that no firm could have any short-run mo-
nopoly power, even if there were only two or three sellers. A more
sensible approach in such situations is to consider output, not price,
to be the decision variable. Then, if rivalry is as intense as one can
imagine, so that each firm makes the output decision that maximizes
its own profits given its rivals' decisions, it is easy to show that the
equilibrium condition for the it (typical) firm in the market is the
following: 68
(2) (P - MC)/P = s1/E
where MC, is the ith firm's marginal cost, and s, is its share of the
market.6 9 Again, the quantity on the left is a direct measure of the
firm's short-run monopoly power. If this is difficult to estimate di-
rectly, one can instead employ the quantity on the right-the ratio
of the firm's market share to the elasticity of demand for the market
as a whole. Even in this hyper-classical case, market share is not
the whole story; a firm with a large share of a market with highly
elastic demand will set a price indistinguishable from marginal cost.
Furthermore, it should be obvious that knowing a firm's market
share in this model, or even the ratio of its share to the market de-
mand elasticity, reveals nothing about its long-run monopoly power.
Finally, in this sort of model, there is no critical or threshold value
of market share above which the firm has monopoly power and
below which it has none.
The assumption of perfect substitutability is critical to the
validity of equation (2). If a market is defined to include products
that are not perfect substitutes, the markups of individual firms
can greatly exceed the ratios of their market shares to the market
demand elasticity. This is clearest in the extreme case in which a
68 Dropping subscripts for the moment, let q be the output of some firm, and
let q be the aggregate output of its rivals. If Q = q + q, the assumption of
homogeneous outputs means that market price, P, must be a (decreasing) function
of Q. In order to maximize its profit for any given q, the firm considered must
choose q so that marginal cost, MC, equals the partial derivative of the firm's total
revenue, qP(-q + q), with respect to q. The latter quantity can be written as
P[I - (qIQE)], where E, the market demand elasticity, is given by -P/(QP').
Equation (2), with s, = q/Q, then follows directly.
69 See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
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"market" has been defined to include products that are totally
unaffected by one another's pricing. In this case a firm can be
small relative to the "market" and yet face a demand curve that
gives it substantial short-run monopoly power. The problem is
not confined to this extreme case; whenever a market includes im-
perfect substitutes, the market share and market demand elasticity
do not suffice to determine the extent of short-run monopoly power,
even if the other assumptions underlying equation (2) hold. The
conclusion that market share alone does not establish short-run
monopoly power follows a fortiori3
0
Although market definition by aggregation over space has firm
foundations in classical economics, aggregation over non-identical
products-the sort of aggregation that was a key issue in the
ReaLemon litigation-seems to have as its intellectual basis the pro-
cedures followed in some empirical work in industrial organiza-
tion.71 In order to use statistical techniques to test hypotheses
about the determinants and results of inter-firm rivalry, many in-
vestigators have mass-produced data on sizeable numbers of mar-
kets. The usual rule is that these markets should include all prod-
ucts among which buyers and sellers can easily switch, so that each
market used in the analysis corresponds to a set of sellers that are
in more or less direct competition.72 Rarely is there any claim that
this can be done with great accuracy 73 or any attempt to be espe-
cially precise; econometric techniques, for example, are seldom if
ever employed to define markets in this context. Again, the pur-
pose of market definition guides the approach: if the sample of
markets is large enough, it is reasonable to hope that minor and
non-systematic errors of aggregation will not have much effect on
the results obtained. Many studies of this sort take profitability as
an indicator of the magnitude of monopoly power and seek to ex-
plain variations in profitability across markets as functions of other
observable quantities.74
70 See generally P. A,=A, supra note 3, at 197, 201-03.
71 Marshall provides a lucid and still useful discussion of the principles involved
in aggregation over space. A. MARsHALL, Pnm rcuLs OF ECONOMICS 323-30 (8th
ed. 1948). It is worth noting that Marshall does not mention the aggregation of
physically distinct goods into a single market. For a discussion of this type of
aggregation in industrial organization studies, see F. ScHEBI , supra note 44, at
52-57, and the references cited therein; and Weiss, supra note 52.
72 See F. Scim=a, supra note 44, at 53. For a discussion of the application
of these principles in a legal context, see United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours
& Co. (The Cellophane Case), 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
73 See generally P. ArcEDA, supra note 3, at 197, 203. Areeda cautions that
"[mlarket definition is customary and it may provide a helpful first approximation,
but have no illusions about its meaning." Id. 203.
74 See Weiss, supra note 52.
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In light of the above background, it is useful to consider the
market definition exercise in ReaLemon, along with its legal and
economic implications for market power. The administrative law
judge concluded that fresh lemons and processed lemon juice were
not closely linked on the supply side, because their preparation in-
volved different production and distribution processes.75 This is a
sensible short-run finding. To make such an assertion for the long
run, however, is equivalent to asserting that entry into the proc-
essed lemon juice industry is difficult; a finding of distinct tech-
nology by itself cannot justify such an assertion. The judge then
considered a great deal of evidence on the demand side.76 After
weighing the evidence, he concluded that the two products were
not sufficiently close substitutes in demand to require placing them
in the same market for antitrust purposes. He then drew an in-
ference about monopoly power: "Having determined that processed
lemon juice constitutes, at the least, a valid submarket for the pur-
poses of this proceeding, there is no question that respondent Bor-
den's ReaLemon brand over the years has had, and now has, a
monopoly share of that market." 77 Moreover, in later discussion
he noted the well-established legal principle that "[t]he existence of
monopoly power may be inferred from a predominant share of the
market." 1
75 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 47-50 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TRAE BEG. BEP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
76 BeaLemon produced usage data indicating that fresh lemons and processed
lemon juice are often used by households for the same purposes. (Both are used in
tea and lemonade, for example.) Econometric work that seemed to show a negative
relation between the ratio of the prices of the two commodities and the ratio of
their sales was introduced and criticized. Id. 16-20. It also pointed out that
ReaLemon's advertising had historically stressed its product's advantages over fresh
lemons. Id. 8. Complaint counsel stressed the different attributes (such as taste
and shelf life) of the two products, the substantial and variable per-ounce price
differences between them, and the apparent lack of attention paid to the price of
fresh lemons by producers and wholesale buyers of processed lemon juice. Com-
plaint Counsers Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 15-28,
Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in [1976] 3
TRADE EG. REP. (CCH) 7[21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n),
No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361
at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
77Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 50 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n) No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978). The quoted
passage is the first sentence of the first finding of fact under the general heading
"Monopoly Power." It is worth noting that the term "submarket" either is shorthand
for "narrowly defined market," or it has no economic meaning at all. "Submarket"
is a term of art in antitrust law, not in economics.
78 Id. 151.
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The economic model underlying this analysis was not made
explicit, but its key implications and assumptions are clear. The
administrative law judge employed a model that assumes that a
large market share always signals both power over price and power
to exclude rivals. In addition, that model has threshold share
values, above which monopoly power is present and important, and
below which it is either absent or unimportant. The above dis-
cussion shows, however, that standard economic models without
these implications do exist. One can only wonder what economic
model was used in ReaLemon and how it was selected.
Whatever model was employed must have assumed that mar-
kets could always be precisely defined and analyzed in isolation;
without that assumption the amount of attention devoted to market
definition and the importance attached to market share are hard to
rationalize. Buyers clearly did not regard other brands of processed
lemon juice as perfect substitutes for ReaLemon. Indeed, the Ini-
tial Decision cites this fact as further evidence of ReaLemon's
monopoly power7 9 It is also clear that processed lemon juice and
fresh lemons are substitutes, albeit imperfect ones. Starting with
ReaLemon, there are thus two gaps in the chain of substitutes, with
the qualitative evidence suggesting that the second (the gap be-
tween lemons and lemon juice) is larger than the first (the gap be-
tween ReaLemon and other lemon juice). For some purposes this
situation can be analyzed in terms of three linked markets; so for
other purposes, it might be appropriate to work with a single lemon
products market. Administrative Law Judge Hanscom apparently
assumed that there must exist a single market, which can be analyzed
in isolation, and that ReaLemon's share of this market sheds some
light on its monopoly power. This assumption, however, is incon-
sistent with the facts.
Suppose one considers ReaLemon brand reconstituted lemon
juice to be a market. ReaLemon's market share is 100%; but in
terms of equation (2), it can be argued that the demand elasticity
is likely to be unusually large because of the existence of other
brands of lemon juice that are close substitutes. An economist
would find this narrow definition of market hard to defend. Sup-
pose next that the market is defined as fresh lemons and processed
lemon juice. Analysis of this market in isolation may be defensi-
ble, but it is surely difficult to attach much significance to
79 Id. 59-67.
So The link between the lemon market and the price of lemon juice concentrate
might also be considered in such an analysis.
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shares within it. Very little meaning attaches to market share
when the market includes commodities that are plainly im-
perfect substitutes. Finally, if one follows the judge and defines
the market as processed lemon juice, both lines of attack are valid:
a close but imperfect substitute is excluded, while the commodities
included are clearly imperfect substitutes for one another in the
eyes of buyers.8'
Thus, there appears to be no market definition in this case that
cannot be attacked-either because it excludes close substitutes, or
because it aggregates dearly imperfect substitutes, or for both
reasons. More precise econometric estimates of cross-elasticities of
demand cannot eliminate this problem, unless they show that the
qualitative judgments expressed above are seriously in error.82 The
kind of market so laboriously sought does not seem to exist here,
and it may not exist in other cases either. This poses no problem
for economic analysis, but it does seem to undercut the presump-
tion that market share rules can be systematically applied to make
reliable inferences about monopoly power.
83
This is not to say that the basic principles and techniques
employed in RcaLemon and elsewhere to define markets are with-
out economic content. As indicated above, they generally have a
respectable ancestry in the industrial organization literature and
can be found elsewhere in economics as well. The point is that the
market definition-market share exercise does not deserve to be taken
so seriously. The analysis in ReaLemon seems more than sufficient
to establish a presumption that ReaLemon had some short-run
power over price; but it does not and could not do more than this.
In the absence of demand elasticity information (and perhaps infor-
mation on ReaLemon's expectations about the behavior of other
sellers), there is no way to go from any sort of market share figure
81 According to Scherer,
[cloncentration ratios (the percentage of total industry sales made by the
largest firms, ranked in order of market shares] understate the true quantum
of market power when markets are defined to include non-substitutes,
* * * when producers enjoy strong brand loyalties or other differentiation
advantages within relevant product lines, and when special institutional
features . . . intrude. The degree of market power is overstated when
substitutes are excluded from the industry definition ....
F. Scmrotu, supra note 44, at 56.
82 For a discussion of the difficulty of inferring market relations from market
elasticity data, see Bishop, Elasticities, Cross-elasticities, and Market Relationships,
42 Am:. EcoN. REv. 779 (1952). For a critical discussion of market definition in
antitrust law, see R. PosNum, supra note 2, at 125-33.
83Areeda notes that "[ilt cannot be emphasized too strongly that market
definition and the assessment of defendant's share of that market give, at best, only
a suggestion of defendant's market power." P. ArxEDA, supra note 3, at 203.
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to any estimate of the magnitude of short-run monopoly power.
Moreover, there is no logical connection between market share at
any instant and a firm's long-run power to protect itself from new
competition.
The Initial Decision does cite ReaLemon's apparently extraor-
dinary profitability as confirmation of the monopoly power im-
plied by its dominant share of "the relevant market." 84 Excluding
the "goodwill" asset on ReaLemon's books,85 and assuming no un-
usually severe accounting problems, ReaLemon's return on invested
capital indicates that it enjoyed persistent excess profits. Together
with the evidence concerning market relations presented in con-
nection with the market definition exercise,86 the evidence on profit-
ability strongly supports the inference that ReaLemon had short-run
monopoly power.82 Without both sorts of evidence, however, the
basis for that inference is much weaker than the Initial Decision's
discussion of market share indicates.88  Moreover, the magnitude of
its excess profits suggests that ReaLemon's short-run monopoly
power was substantial, and the persistence of high rates of return
suggests that some obstacle to effective competition may have ex-
isted. Perhaps more importantly in the context of this case,
ReaLemon's profitability indicates that Borden would have had a
strong interest in restraining competition. But all of these obser-
vations provide only a starting point from which the analysis of
ReaLemon's possible long-run monopoly power can begin.
IV. TESTS FOR PREDATORY PRICING
During the relevant time period it seems clear that ReaLemon's
pricing policy was influenced by the pricing and output decisions
84 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 67-68 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comrnm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TRkDE REc. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
85 This asset was created in 1962 when Borden purchased the business for a
price reflecting the high future profits the business was expected to produce. Id.
See text accompanying note 7 supra.
86 The evidence on market relations indicates at least that it makes little sense to
think of ReaLemon as small relative to all other sellers of nearly perfect substitutes.
87 In horizontal merger cases, especially those in which the merger has not been
consummated, profit data on the merged firm are likely to be lacking. This means
that more stress must be placed on other evidence, not that confident reliance on
market share computation alone has any more economic justification than in
monopolization cases.
S8 In its subsequent opinion the FTC essentially followed the Initial Decision in
finding that ReaLemon's large share of the relevant market established its monopoly
power. It also pointed out that this conclusion was supported by ReaLemon's
premium brand status and profitability. See Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Cornm'n),
No. 8978, slip op. at 13-18 (Nov. 7, 1978).
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of other producers of processed lemon juice, and by Golden Crown
in particular. ReaLemon reacted to Golden Crown's rapid expan-
sion and the erosion of its own market share (which it generally
computed in terms of processed lemon juice) by lowering prices in
geographic areas where Golden Crown's share was largest. Because
ReaLemon was found to possess monopoly power, the crucial legal
question in the Initial Decision was whether or not its pricing
policy constituted unlawful maintenance of that power. Alterna-
tively, the question was whether ReaLemon's pricing was predatory.
In answering this latter question, it is useful to adopt Bork's provi-
sional definition of predation as
a firm's deliberate aggression against one or more rivals
through the employment of business practices that would
not be considered profit-maximizing except for the expecta-
tion either that (1) rivals will be driven from the market
... or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon
competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or
threatening.8 9
Borden was not generally known as a badly run firm. There-
fore, if predatory pricing could have been shown to be irrational
in general or irrational in this case, it might have been possible to
establish a presumption that the ReaLemon division's pricing was
not predatory. Such a showing would not conclusively have proved
the point, though, because even well-run firms sometimes make
mistakes. As Posner has noted in this context, if certain kinds of
mistakes have significant adverse consequences, it may be good policy
to prescribe penalties for those who make them.90 Moreover, as
Yamey 91 and Posner 92 have argued convincingly, economic theory
does not presently provide the theoretical or practical tools to prove
that predatory pricing is never in the predator's interest. The
predator firm sacrifices some current profit in the expectation of
future gain; the rationality of this sacrifice can be directly evalu-
ated only by comparing current losses with expected future gains.
The latter is hard to assess in principle and impossible to observe
in practice. If the predator has sufficient advantages over the prey
(for example, much easier access to liquid capital), and if an epi-
sode of predation has desirable long-lived effects on the employment
89 R. Borx, supra note 2, at 144.
90 R. Posture, supra note 2, at 187.
9l Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 129
(1972).
02 R. PosNue, supra note 2, at 184-86.
19791 1017
1018 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of relevant assets or on the expectations of actual or potential rivals,
predatory pricing may ultimately prove profitable; thus, it may ap-
pear profitable at its inception. Actions that appear mad in the
short run may be quite sane in the long run; a predator's reputa-
tion for irrationality may instill timidity in actual or potential
rivals.93 Similarly, current models cannot yield solid judgments
about the rationality or irrationality of predatory pricing under any
particular set of observable conditions.
Most economists would probably agree with Areeda and Turner
that "proven cases of predatory pricing have been extremely rare." 1
Consequently, Areeda and Turner, as well as Bork, draw the rea-
sonable inference that predatory pricing in fact occurs very rarely-
whether it is rational or not.95 Accordingly, Areeda and Turner
note that caution must be exercised in formulating rules to deal
with alleged predatory pricing, "lest the threat of litigation, particu-
larly by private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive pric-
ing." 98 Bork goes further and argues that it is unwise "to con-
struct rules about a phenomenon that probably does not exist or
which, should it exist in very rare cases, the courts would have
grave difficulty distinguishing from competitive price behavior." 97
He would thus exclude predatory pricing from the list of possible
antitrust violations.98 Most economists would probably agree with
93 As noted in text accompanying notes 17-18 supra, Golden Crown entered the
processed lemon juice industry without engaging in extensive market analysis.
Golden Crown's management may not have known of the difficulties encountered by
Sunkist in the 1950's. Or, if it knew of them, it might have thought that Borden
would not act as aggressively toward it as ReaLemon-Puritan apparently had acted
toward Sunkist. As is true in other areas of economics as well, the impossibility of
observing expectations directly causes serious problems.
94 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HAnv. L. REv. 697, 699 (1975).
95 Id. See R. Bour, supra note 2, at 144-55.
96 Areeda & Turner, supra note 94, at 699. Although the complaint in ReaLemon
was initiated by the Federal Trade Commission, it is worth noting that Golden
Crown's successor, G.C. Citrus Corporation, ified a related damage suit against
Borden. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent 11,
Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in [1976] 3
TRAD, REG. REP. (CCH) 7[21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n),
No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TnAnz BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361
at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
9 7 R. BoRK, supra note 2, at 154.
198 Id. This argument can be given a cost/benefit gloss. Suppose that in the
sample of cases that can be brought under some predatory pricing rule, predation is
actually present with probability p. Let there be zero loss if any case is decided
correctly. (This assumption neglects litigation costs.) Suppose that the average
loss from undetected predation is M; thus, if all allegations of predatory pricing were
simply dismissed, the expected total loss would be Mp. Suppose that the prob-
ability of an incorrect decision is e. Let the loss if relief is imposed when no
predation is actually present be C. (This loss stems from inhibition of competitive
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Areeda and Turner; Bork's proposal is less likely to win wide ac-
ceptance.
Before returning to Bork's proposal below, it is instructive to
consider, in the context of the facts in ReaLemon, some recent at-
tempts to use economic theory to devise clear standards for preda-
tory pricing. Specifically, do these analyses permit a clear-cut judg-
ment on ReaLemon's pricing behavior?
In an influential and widely-cited essay, Areeda and Turner
propose definite tests for predation, to be applied to a monopolist
"in the market in which he has monopoly power." 99 They argue
that because marginal-cost pricing has well-known efficiency proper-
ties,100 and because only prices equal to or above marginal cost can
maximize short-run profits under any plausible assumptions, only
prices below short-run marginal cost should be considered preda-
tory.1 1 Recognizing that reliable estimates of marginal cost are
difficult to obtain, they propose the use of "reasonably anticipated
average variable cost" 102 as the standard; prices above this quantity
are to be lawful, prices below it predatory and unlawful. This
shift is not without its substantive consequences, as Scherer has
pointed out,103 but the technical issues he raises seem secondary in
the present context.
In the Initial Decision in ReaLemon, Judge Hanscom con-
sidered the Areeda-Turner average variable cost test.104 As has al-
ready been noted,10 5 ReaLemon's prices were apparently above
accurate estimates, prepared after the fact, of its average variable
conduct.) Then it is easy to show that the expected loss occurring when all cases
are litigated exceeds that occurring when all cases are dismissed if and only if e
exceeds 1/[1 + [(1 - p)/p](C/M)]. If p is low, say .01, and (CIM) is non-
trivial, say 0.5, then the critical value of e can be quite low-.02 in this example.
If error is more likely, it is better simply to bring no cases.
99 Areeda & Turner, supra note 94, at 732. See also Areeda & Turner, Scherer
on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv. L. RtEv. 891 (1976); Areeda & Turner,
Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337 (1978).
100 Areeda & Turner, supra note 94, at 709-12. See generally F. Sctmnn,
supra note 44, at 12-13; E. L.ANs=LD, EcoNoucs 452-57 (1974).
101 Id. 733. The rule that monopoly pricing below marginal cost should be
presumed predatory is subject to exception when "price, though below marginal cost,
is at or above average cost." Id. 712.
102 Id. 733.
'
0 3 See text accompanying notes 120-24 infra. See also Areeda & Turner,
Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HArrv. L. REv. 891 (1976); B. Poste,
supra note 2, at 191-93; Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Com-
ment, 89 HAv. L. REv. 869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory
Pricing, 89 HA.v. L. REv. 901 (1976).
104 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 117-30 (Aug. 19,
1976), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in TnADE BEG. BEP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
' 0 5 See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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cost. If ReaLemon could have "reasonably anticipated" those fig-
ures, its pricing would have been declared lawful under the Areeda-
Turner test. On the other hand, it is not clear from the record what
the firm's management thought costs were at the time the prices in
question were set. Depending on how the figures are treated, some
of its prices were close to or below the unit cost figures that were
available to decisionmakers. In any case, the price-cost gaps were
not unusually large under any of the definitions discussed in the
Initial Decision."0 The question then arises whether any set of
cost estimates deserves to be treated as exact values of "reasonably
anticipated average variable cost," so that prices only slightly lower
than such estimates would serve to establish a violation. 07 If the
likelihood of cost estimation error is considered, how can it be prac-
tically incorporated into the rule? Although the Areeda-Turner
test does not yield a completely clear result in ReaLemon, it does
seem to indicate that the company's pricing policy should be
deemed non-predatory and therefore lawful.
A different test is suggested by Posner, who defines predatory
pricing as "pricing at a level calculated to exclude from the market
an equally or more efficient competitor." 108 After analyzing the
implications of this definition, he concludes that "[p]roof of sales
below average balance-sheet cost with intent to exclude might be
enough to establish a prima facie case of predatory pricing." 109
Average balance-sheet cost would be obtained by dividing total
accounting cost by output; if the accounting system has no major
biases, this quantity is approximately average total economic cost,
minus the per-unit cost of equity capital. A prima facie case could
be rebutted by a defendant's showing that its pricing could be
justified in terms of the relevant marginal cost.110
'o6 See Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 117-30 (Aug. 19,
1976), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in TaBnz BEG. RBP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
107 Bork stresses the complexities and allocation problems involved in preparing
cost estimates that can effectively be utilized in litigation. He argues further that
"the costs the law uses are only coincidentally related to real economic costs."
R. Boax, supra note 2, at 154.
On appeal, the FTC also considered the Areeda-Turner test, and on this issue
the majority agreed with the conclusion of the Initial Decision. Borden, Inc.
(Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978, slip op. at 28-29 (Nov. 7, 1978). But in a
concurring opinion, Commissioner Clanton disagreed and found that ReaLemon had
made sales at prices below average variable cost. Id. (Opinion of Clanton, Comm'r,
concurring, at 4).
10811. Postur, supra note 2, at 188 (emphasis in original).
109 Id. 190.
110 Either short-ran marginal cost or long-run marginal cost would be used to
rebut this presumption where each is the "correct guide to efficient pricing in its
circumstances." Id. 191.
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A number of problems arise when this analysis is applied to
ReaLemon. First, in terms of the underlying definition, was
Golden Crown "an equally or more efficient competitor"? Golden
Crown's production costs per ounce of lemon juice appear to have
been comparable to ReaLemon's; but, all else being equal, buyers
were willing to pay more for an ounce of ReaLemon than for an
ounce of Golden Crown. Thus, in terms of the dollar value of out-
puts per dollar of inputs employed, ReaLemon was distinctly more
efficient.
A case can be made, however, that the premium price com-
manded by ReaLemon was at least in part a reflection of consumers'
greater experience with ReaLemon than with rival brands.111  Ar-
guably, there was learning on the demand side. Because the two
products were apparently physically indistinguishable, it is at least
plausible that if buyers had had the same experience with Golden
Crown that they had with ReaLemon, the two products would have
sold for the same price. If one adopts a static notion of efficiency,
buyers' preferences for ReaLemon would imply that the product was
produced and marketed more efficiently than Golden Crown; but if
one takes a more dynamic view of efficiency, there is no obvious
reason to suppose that Golden Crown was not "an equally or more
efficient competitor." Identical problems arise under classical
"learning-by-doing" in production, when a firm's unit cost is a de-
creasing function of its total cumulative output to date.112 If such
learning is important, a new entrant may have higher costs today
than an established firm, even though with the same production
experience it would have the same costs.
On the basis of the data in the Initial Decision,113 it seems
likely, though by no means certain, that ReaLemon made at least
some sales below its "average balance sheet cost." 114 Under Pos-
ner's suggested test, if the firm never sold below "average balance
sheet cost," charges should be dismissed; on the other hand, if it
111 See text accompanying notes 167-211 infra.
1
3
2 For an interesting analysis of entry deterrence in the presence of "learning
by doing" in production, see B. Smilery & S. Ravid, The Importance of Being First:
Oligopoly Pricing with Learning (June 1978) (unpublished paper at Cornell Uni-
versity) (copy on file with the author).
113Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 117-30 (Aug. 19,
1976), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in TA.DE REG. RP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
114 In both the Opinion of the Commission, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978, slip. op. at 29 (Nov. 7, 1978), and the concurring opinion of
Commissioner Pitofsky, id. (Opinion of Pitofsky, Comm'r, concurring, at 20), it is
stated that ReaLemon did make substantial sales at prices below "average total
cost," which in context is clearly Posner's "average balance sheet cost."
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did, further inquiry would be necessary. But when the analysis is
expanded to consider the definition of predation from which Pos-
ner's test is derived, things seem less clear. As was already indi-
cated, n5 ReaLemon was so situated that in order effectively to meet
its prices, Golden Crown would have had to sell below its own
"average balance sheet costs." If a static view of efficiency is
adopted, Golden Crown was a less efficient competitor, and only
ReaLemon's costs matter. Conversely, if one accepts that in a dy-
namic sense Golden Crown was arguably as efficient as ReaLemon,
it could be argued that prices above ReaLemon's "average balance
sheet costs" could serve to exclude an equally efficient competitor
if they forced losses upon Golden Crown.116 Acceptance of this
argument could, of course, place ReaLemon in the awkward position
of having to justify its prices in terms of reasonably derived esti-
mates of a rival's costs.
In order to establish a prima facie case against alleged preda-
tors such as ReaLemon, Posner would also require some evidence
of exclusionary intent, although he clearly recognizes the difficulty
of establishing intent in litigation." 7  In ReaLemon, complaint
counsel were able to find a number of documents that strongly
suggest that ReaLemon's top management intended to regain sales
lost to Golden Crown and to reduce the latter's market share, or
at least hinder its expansion. Some documents (none of which,
however, had been written by top management) suggest an intent
to exclude Golden Crown from some regional markets. If one
follows Posner, who attaches little weight to such documents be-
cause they merely reflect "the inveterate tendency of sales executives
to brag to their superiors about their competitive prowess, often
using metaphors of coercion that are compelling evidence of preda-
tory intent to the naive," 118 one is left with little evidence point-
ing to exclusionary intent. It would appear, then, that Posner's
requirements for a prima facie case were not met in ReaLemon.
However, if Posner, like Bork, had considered the chastening of
rivals to be a possible goal of predation and had phrased his rule to
115 See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
116 After mentioning Posner's rule, the Opinion of the Commission pays particular
attention to the apparent fact that prices above ReaLemon's cost could force Golden
Crown to price below its own costs, thus tending to exclude a rival of apparently
equal production efficiency. Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Conr'n), No. 8978, slip
op. at 29-31 (Nov. 7, 1978). See text accompanying notes 12-38 supra.
317 R. PosNwn, supra note 2, at 189-90.
118 Id. 190.
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forbid intent to chasten, a prima facie case could have been estab-
lished against ReaLemon under this test. 1 9
If such an expanded rule were employed, ReaLemon probably
could have rebutted this case. ReaLemon could have argued that in
an intensely competitive situation, in which rivals are selling below
average total cost, the quantity relevant for pricing decisions is
short-run marginal cost. It then could have invoked the Areeda-
Turner analysis, used average variable cost as a proxy for short-run
marginal cost, and pointed to the evidence that its price had never
been set below average variable cost. Thus, a slightly expanded
version of Posner's rule would be likely, though not certain, to
suggest that ReaLemon had engaged in predatory pricing.
ReaLemon, however, might have succeeded in rebutting the pre-
sumption thus established by effectively invoking the Areeda-Turner
test. Because the rebuttal argument just outlined must be usable in
many cases, it might be simpler to begin with the average variable
cost test.
Scherer 120 and Williamson 12 effectively criticize the economic
models underlying these cost-based rules.12 2  Both argue that by its
very nature, predatory pricing is transient and generally localized
in space. Thus, the relation between price and marginal cost dur-
ing an episode of such pricing in some locality is likely to be of
negligible importance relative to pricing policies at other times and
in other places. Had ReaLemon made sales to the Philadelphia
and Buffalo chains, as mentioned above, 123 at prices below marginal
cost in December 1973, it is true that an efficiency loss, relative to
sales at marginal cost, would have resulted. But to focus solely on
this loss, while ignoring the substantial general excess of price over
marginal cost suggested by ReaLemon's overall profitability, is to
use one small, atypical tree to evaluate a large forest. Both Scherer
119 Bork phrases his alternate definition of predatory conduct as including
situations in which the expectation of the predator is that "rivals will be chastened
sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or
threatening." R. Boni, supra note 2, at 144.
120 Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Huimv. L.
lEv. 869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARv. L. REv.
901 (1976).
121 Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
LJ. 284 (1977).
' 2 2 See Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HAv. L.
REv. 891 (1976); Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J.
1337 (1978); Williamson, A Preliminary Response, 87 YALE L.J. 1353 (1978); 0.
Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, II (August 1978) (Discussion Paper
No. 26, Center for the Study of Organizational Innovation, University of Penn-
sylvania) (copy on file with the author).
123 See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
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and Williamson argue that a proper application of economic prin-
ciples in this context requires consideration of the overall, long-
run effects of predation, or of any standards adopted by the courts
to define it. At this point, the two part company: Scherer suggests
that a detailed "rule of reason" examination of the relevant facts
is necessary, while Williamson proposes a set of "per se" rules.
Most of Williamson's analysis is devoted to an examination of
how a dominant firm responds to the appearance of a new entrant.
The rules for this case are different from those Williamson would
apply to deal with alleged predation or exclusionary practices among
established firms. Williamson defines a "dominant-firm industry"
as one in which "the largest firm has a market share of at least sixty
percent, and entry into the market is not easy." 1 Without going
through the sort of market definition-market share exercise dis-
cussed in section III, however, it is not clear how one would estab-
lish that a firm is either dominant in this sense or-what seems to
come to the same thing-a monopolist in the sense that that term
is used by Areeda and Tumer.12 Such market definition-market
share exercises are an unreliable approach to the measurement of
short-run monopoly power. In the present case, and in others, one
can focus on the economically relevant considerations without at-
tempting to define markets precisely or using structural definitions
of "monopoly" or "dominance." Clearly ReaLemon and Golden
Crown were affected by one another's pricing. Moreover,
ReaLemon's management believed, with good reason, that its profits
were threatened by Golden Crown; at the very least, ReaLemon
would have been better off if Golden Crown had either vanished
or become much less aggressive. This suggests that ReaLemon had
substantial motivation to chasten or exclude Golden Crown.
ReaLemon's much larger initial sales, wider geographic distribution,
and greater financial resources, coupled with its "premium brand"
status, suggest that it might have had or plausibly thought it had
the ability to chasten or exclude Golden Crown. Surely no show-
ing of dominance or monopoly can do more than indicate motive
and ability; such indications are more appropriately sought in a
direct comparison of the alleged predator and the prey than through
attempts to define "the relevant market" and to compute their re-
spective shares of it.
In applying Williamson's rules to the ReaLemon case, one must
initially determine whether Golden Crown should be considered
124 Williamson, supra note 121, at 292.
125 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 94.
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a new entrant or an established firm. Golden Crown sold processed
lemon juice, apparently quite aggressively, for more than a year
before its name appeared in available ReaLemon documents; this
fact suggests that it should be viewed as an established firm. On
the other hand, Golden Crown had not entered all of ReaLemon's
regional markets, and it appears that ReaLemon was worried that
it would later do so effectively. This fact, along with the small
scale of Golden Crown's operations relative to those of ReaLemon
at the time of the events that prompted the complaint, suggests that
Golden Crown should be treated as a new entrant. Had the ad-
ministrative law judge been forced to make a choice between these
alternatives, he would not have found it an easy one. On the basis
of Williamson's rules, it would have been a most important deci-
sion, however.
Suppose first that Golden Crown is considered to have been an
established firm in an industry with stable demand. Williamson
would ignore "episodic price wars" 121 and would consider preda-
tory pricing issues only "if price cutting persists and there is an
indication that one or more firms is relying on a deep pocket in
an effort to force exit of some firms from the industry." 127 Was
ReaLemon's pricing more than episodic? How would one decide?
Must one wait until price is increased before filing a complant?
Let us go further and suppose that it is held that ReaLemon's price
cuts were sufficiently long-lived to be potentially illegal. William-
son would then apply an average total cost test, which ReaLemon
probably would have failed.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Golden Crown is considered
to have been a new entrant. Williamson's analysis of this situation
is based on a standard model, derived from Bain,128 of a homogen-
ous product market with substantial economies of scale and a single
established seller. He assumes that entry will be deterred if the
expected post-entry price is below the entrant's average total cost.
He then shows that a rule of law prohibiting the established seller
from increasing its output after entry induces that firm to charge a
lower pre-entry price in order to deter entry than would a number
of cost-based rules, including that of Areeda and Turner.129 His
126 Williamson, supra note 121, at 336.
127 Id. 321.
128 See generally J. BAN, supra note 43.
1
2
9 The theory is that the established firm will position itself before entry so
that it will be able (both physically and legally) to cut price below any entrants
average total cost if entry occurs. See also Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and
Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 B=r. J. EcoN. 534 (1977).
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proposed rule for new entry would make it illegal for a dominant
firm to increase its output, adjusted for changes in the level of de-
mand, for twelve to eighteen months after the appearance of a new
entrant.130 After that period, an average total cost test would apply.
Although there probably would have been considerable debate on
this point, let us suppose for the sake of argument that all of
ReaLemon's discounting had been held subject to this output test.
Then, did ReaLemon engage in predation?
Initially, one must define a base period against which increases
in unit sales are to be measured. If 1972 is selected as the base
year, then the evidence shows that ReaLemon intended to violate
Williamson's rule; 131 it intended, through the use of price cuts, to
increase its share of processed lemon juice sales in some regions at
the expense of Golden Crown. Had this policy succeeded,
ReaLemon surely would have increased its demand-adjusted output,
because an increase in market share plus a lower average price must
imply higher unit sales.
Golden Crown was not a passive competitor, however; it may
have reacted by making some sales below its average total cost, a
possibility not recognized in Williamson's formal economic model.
In any case, ReaLemon did not achieve its share objectives; its
nationwide market share in 1973 was lower than its 1972 share.
ReaLemon may or may not have managed to increase demand-
adjusted unit sales in its target areas; 132 it certainly could not have
ascertained this result until after the fact. Assuming, as seems
likely, that demand-adjusted output did not rise, should one then
find ReaLemon guilty of attempted predation, or dismiss the
charges because it failed in a serious attempt to break the law?
Suppose all the facts were the same, but no evidence at all on intent
were available? ReaLemon's pricing below average total cost would
then have to be found lawful under the Williamson test. Con-
versely, ReaLemon's conduct would have to be found unlawful if
it continued to set its price below average total cost beyond eighteen
130 See Williamson, supra note 121, at 334-35.
131 Of course, ReaLemon would argue for an earlier benchmark, probably 1968,
the year before Golden Crown began to challenge it, in order to show its lack of
output response during the initial twelve-to-eighteen-month period.
132 Data available do not permit a definite conclusion on this point, but it may
be worth noting that Golden Crown's shares of processed lemon juice sales in Buffalo
and in Philadelphia in 1974, after the ReaLemon sales at very low prices, were both
around 29%. Brief of Respondent Borden, Inc., in Support of its Appeal from the
Initial Decision of the Administrative Law Judge 35, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh.
No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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months after Golden Crown had become visible. If the Williamson
rule had been law during this period and ReaLemon had pursued
the same course of action, Golden Crown could have insured itself
treble damages either by failing to react to ReaLemon's discounting
or by failing to make deliveries in key areas.1
33
Some of the ambiguities and difficult choices that arise when
one attempts to apply the Williamson standards to ReaLemon
would be likely to arise in other cases as well. But the deeper
problem revealed by the foregoing discussion is that the economic
model underlying Williamson's output test is inappropriate; for it
fails in important respects to fit the facts of the case. Williamson's
potential entrants are deterred if they expect that to compete suc-
cessfully it will be necessary to set a post-entry price below their
average total cost; in this case, however, Golden Crown was ap-
parently willing to expand its sales at such prices for some time.
In Williamson's model, because output is a decision variable, it can
sensibly be used to evaluate behavior; whereas in the processed
lemon juice market, demand for any one brand was critically de-
pendent on the prices of all others. Price, not output, was the deci-
sion variable. In Williamson's model there is a single market price,
whereas the facts of this case indicate that rival brands of processed
lemon juice were sold at different prices. The barrier to entry that
drives Williamson's model is the high cost of producing on a small
scale; but scale economies do not seem to be important in the
reconstituted lemon juice industry. Finally, the main obstacle to
effective competition discussed by Administrative Law Judge
Hanscom in the Initial Decision is the "premium brand" status of
ReaLemon, which enabled it to command a higher price than
other brands. This sort of obstacle, is not easily built into the
Williamson model; 134 this is especially true if the premium brand
status is subject to erosion over time.
If the economic model from which Williamson's test is derived
is not suitable for use in the analysis of ReaLemon, it is hard to
believe that its implications should be accepted in all other cases.
Thus, Williamson's rule must be inapplicable to at least some
1 3 3 An essential point of Williamson's analysis is that any rule of law on preda-
tion will affect an intelligent firm's actions, both before and after entry. Thus,
ReaLemon's actions would likely have been different had the Williamson rule been
law.
134 This is not to say that there exdst other predatory pricing rules derived from
models of more general applicability, or from models that would be more appropriate
in this case. The point is simply that one must be skeptical of a rule formally
derived from an economic model that does not seem to fit the facts of the particular
situation considered.
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cases. It has been argued above that the Scherer la1-Williamson 136
critique of the economic analysis underlying the apparently simple
cost-based rules of Areeda and Turner,137 and Posner,13 8 establishes
that these rules cannot be defensibly applied to all, or even most,
cases. It follows that we do not possess any simple yet universally
applicable rules for predatory pricing.139
If the conclusions stated in the preceding paragraph are ac-
cepted, only two supportable general policies toward predatory pric-
ing exist. One could follow Bork 140 and simply drop such conduct
from the list of proscribed practices. If predatory pricing is in fact
very rare, and if courts always have considerable difficulty distin-
guishing it from vigorous but innocent competition, Bork's solution
may be the safest route. The economic case for this policy is
strengthened if one fears that courts, confronted with difficult deci-
sions, are likely to err in the direction of protecting competitors
rather than competition. 141
But there are problems with such a drastic prescription. The
apparent infrequency with which predatory pricing is attempted
cannot be totally unrelated to the courts' hostility toward the con-
cept and to the propensity of small firms to allege predation. Fur-
thermore, not all cases of alleged predatory pricing are identical;
judicial error is much more likely in some than in others. It is at
least plausible that the removal of predatory pricing from the list
of proscribed antitrust practices would produce some cases that any
reasonable person could distinguish from innocent competition.
If, for these or other reasons, it is decided that predatory pric-
ing cannot simply be declared lawful, only one economically de-
fensible general policy choice would remain: Scherer's proposal that
courts follow a "rule of reason" approach and perform "a thorough
135 Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Hazv. L.
BEv. 869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HAnv. L.
REv. 901 (1976).
136 Williamson, supra note 121.
137 Areeda & Turner, supra note 94.
1
38 R. PosuNE, supra note 2, at 190-91.
139 In his concurring opinion in this case, Commissioner Pitofsky proposed
another rule that deserves mention. He would disregard intent and find predation
if either (a) price was below average variable cost, or (b) price was below average
balance sheet cost and barriers to entry were high. The difficulty of measuring
barriers to entry is well known; thus, this test must involve application of the "rule
of reason," a fact that Pitofsky acknowledges. See Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978) (Opinion of Pitofsky, Comm'r, concurring, at
18).
140 R. Bopx, supra note 2, at 154-55.
141 One might acquire such a fear by reading Posner. See R. Posnr, supra
note 2, at 193-96.
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examination of the factual circumstances accompanying the mo-
nopolist's alleged predatory behavior, how the monopolist's officials
perceived the probable effects of its behavior (i.e., intent), and the
structural consequences actually flowing from the behavior." 142
Scherer's suggestion 143 that sound policy here must involve, in
effect, long-run cost/benefit analysis has been attacked as unwieldy
and unworkable. 144 But Scherer's answer to such criticism cannot
be dismissed out of hand:
[JWust about any important Sherman Act, section 2 or
Federal Trade Commission Act, section 5 monopolization
case entails discovery and trial costs running into the mil-
lions of dollars. If, despite such vast outlays, the existing
adjudicative system cannot cope with complex scale econ-
omy and behavioral questions, the solution, I contend, is
not to adopt oversimplified rules of thumb that it can
handle. Rather, a new and better system should be de-
vised.146
Although detailed economic analysis will probably be necessary in
some cases, both fairness and economic efficiency would be en-
hanced by the adoption of understandable rules that permit courts
to dismiss patently groundless charges of predation. An average
total cost test may be appropriate here, but further study of alterna-
tive rules designed to exclude obviously bad cases is surely justified.
In any event, in ReaLemon Administrative Law Judge Hans-
com did perform a "rule of reason" analysis. As was noted above, 146
he determined that ReaLemon had monopoly power, largely on the
basis of its share of "the relevant market." He deduced from docu-
mentary evidence that ReaLemon had exhibited intent to main-
tain and preserve its monopoly. He found that it had used
discriminatory price differentials in different regions and "unreason-
ably low prices" to achieve this end. Because its share of the
processed lemon juice "market" was still a healthy seventy-five
142 Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Hnv. L.
REv. 869, 890 (1976).
143 Scherer believes that the application of cost-based rules "vould be incom-
patible in any event with vigorous competition." Scherer, Some Last Words on
Predatory Pricing, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 901, 903 (1976).
144 See Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 Hnv. L.
REv. 891, 897 (1976); Williamson, supra note 121, at 288 n.16. These commen-
tators feel that application of the Scherer framework would involve long-run analysis
that must be speculative and indeterminate. See also R. BonE, supra note 2, at
154-55.
345 Scherer, supra note 143, at 903 (emphasis in original).
146 See text accompanying notes 39-88 supra.
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percent in 1974, he concluded that ReaLemon had in fact achieved
the goal of maintaining its monopoly position. Taken together,
intent, actions, and effects were sufficient to establish a violation of
the law.
The issues involved here are not simple, but the analytical
approach employed in the Initial Decision is not the best way to
resolve them. ReaLemon clearly was a lucrative operation, and its
management felt that its long-run profitability could be enhanced
by price moves directed against Golden Crown; one need not define
markets or compute market shares to reach this conclusion. Be-
cause of ReaLemon's superior status in the minds of consumers, its
management might plausibly have felt that reducing price to a level
equal to or below average total cost would cause serious injury to
Golden Crown. It is difficult to determine whether ReaLemon's
management did expect or might plausibly have expected that
Golden Crown would either substantially retrench its operations
or drop out of the industry. In any event, it did neither; Golden
Crown's share continued to grow, and the terms of its sale to
Seven-Up in late 1974147 indicate that at least one firm estimated
that it had accumulated positive "goodwill" by that time, in spite
of ReaLemon's actions. The growth of Golden Crown, when con-
sidered in light of the circumstances surrounding its sale, suggests
that whatever its intent or expectations, ReaLemon did not man-
age to reduce the effective rivalry it faced.148
The Initial Decision focuses on ReaLemon's substantial market
share in 1974 as evidence of its continuing dominance.149 This
reflects capture by models in which market share is given excessive
weight as a measure of monopoly power. More stress should per-
haps be placed on ReaLemon's rapid loss of share in the 1970-1974
period. In any case, if ReaLemon's initial expectations of success
were influenced by superior access to liquid capital, the sale of
Golden Crown to Seven-Up would surely have altered those expec-
tations.
Golden Crown certainly would have been better off if
ReaLemon had not engaged in the price and discount policies listed
in the complaint. In deciding that ReaLemon's prices were "un-
147 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
148 One should not rely too heavily upon the sale of Golden Crown to Seven-Up
because the sale occurred after the FTC had issued a complaint against Borden.
The issuance of the complaint may have affected Seven-Up's expectations about
future market conditions.
149 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 134-36 (Aug. 19,
1976), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in TAADE REG. lhP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
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reasonably low," the administrative law judge relied on Golden
Crown's costs as a benchmark.150 This approach resembles what
Williamson terms "a naked theory of umbrella pricing-in order to
ensure the viability of a new entrant, the dominant firm is expected
to maintain price." 151 Such a standard is generally unacceptable
because it is biased against innocent, competitive price reductions
that benefit buyers. One cannot infer from his comparison of
ReaLemon's prices with Golden Crown's costs that the administra-
tive law judge was employing "a naked theory of umbrella pricing,"
because such comparisons are also made when the dynamic effi-
ciency issues considered above are addressed. 15 2
This review of intent and effect does not establish beyond rea-
sonable doubt that ReaLemon's pricing was predatory or consti-
tuted monopolization. In cases like this, in which the economic
analysis apparently yields no definite conclusion, it is sensible to
heed the warnings of Areeda and Turner,153 and Bork,154 about
the dangers of inhibiting competition and find for the respondent
company. Some of the strong language in the ReaLemon docu-
ments introduced by complaint counsel to establish intent might
make this difficult to do. But without conclusive evidence of in-
tent to do much more than recoup losses and check a rival's ex-
pansion, and with no evidence that these goals had been achieved,
dismissal of charges seems warranted. One can sensibly couple
Scherer's rule of reason with Bork's strong presumption of in-
nocence.
V. THE DESIGN OF RELIEF: TRADEMARK LICENSING
Administrative Law Judge Hanscom did not dismiss the charges
against ReaLemon in the Initial Decision in Borden Inc. 55 After
finding that the company had monopolized, he turned to the ques-
tion of relief. He began with the observation that "[i]n a 'mo-
nopolization' case, adequate relief must put an end to the monopoly
position, and break up or render impotent the monopoly power
found to have been preserved and maintained in violation of
150 Id. 133-34.
151 Williamson, supra note 121, at 328.
15 2 See text accompanying notes 110-17 supra.
253 Areeda & Turner, supra note 94, at 699.
154 R. BonE supra note 2, at 154-55.
155 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in
[1976] 3 ThADE PEc. REP. (CCH) ff 21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of
the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TrADE REG,. REP. (CCH) Adv.
Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
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law." 156 Immediately after stating that a cease and desist order
would not accomplish this end, he declared:
The heart of the monopoly power preserved and main-
tained by respondent Borden lies in the ReaLemon trade-
mark and its dominant market position. For competition
to enter the processed lemon juice industry, the barrier to
entry which inheres in the ReaLemon trademark must be
eliminated. As a consequence, in the judgment of the
undersigned, the only effective relief under the facts shown
by the record in this case requires the licensing of the
ReaLemon brand name to others wishing to enter the pro-
duction, marketing and sale of processed reconstituted
lemon juice.
5 7
As has already been noted, the order attached to the Intial Deci-
sion called for compulsory licensing of the ReaLemon mark for a
period of ten years, at rates intended only to cover Borden's costs of
licensing and of insuring adequate quality control. In addition,
Borden was ordered to cease and desist from pricing practices in-
jurious to competition. 58
Whatever the proper role of economic analysis in the deter-
mination of the legal status of particular acts or practices, surely
some economic theory must be relied upon when relief of this sort is
imposed. If the objective of such structural relief is to improve
economic performance rather than to punish offenders, the design
of that relief must be based on an economic model which predicts
that more efficient resource use will flow from the announced
order. 59 This section will show that no satisfactory model of this
sort was employed to analyze the relief ordered in ReaLemon.
Thereafter, I will present an economic analysis of the role of the
ReaLemon trademark and will indicate some of the consequences
of the judge's decision to mandate licensing. Although the analysis
may be of some general interest, its main purpose is to illustrate
the importance of integrating the central facts of any individual
case into a coherent model before prescribing structural change.
It is apparent that in markets in which both ReaLemon and
Golden Crown competed, ReaLemon's trademark provided its
156 Id. 162-63 (citations omitted).
157 Id. 164.
158 Id. 167-70.
'59 See R. Boax, supra note 2; Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65
COLum. L. REv. 363 (1965). But see Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 66
COLum L. RBv. 377 (1965) (suggesting that political purposes, as well as resource
allocation, are relevant to antitrust policy).
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main (and probably its only significant) advantage over Golden
Crown. 16 0 The Initial Decision describes at length the widespread
acceptance of the ReaLemon name, terming it "virtually the generic
name for bottled lemon juice." 161 The price differentials that
ReaLemon could charge-apparently entirely because of the strength
of its "consumer franchise"--are also noted. This premium brand
status is described in the opinion simply as having been "created
by a number of factors including advertising and promotion over
the years." 162 This is hardly an adequate model of the source of
the ReaLemon trademark's status or value.1 3  Similarly, the con-
clusion that ReaLemon's trademark was an important source of its
power to exclude competition 164 is apparently based on its historic
price premium and on expert testimony characterizing it as "a
successfully differentiated product." 165 However, that term amounts
to little more than a statement that consumers perceived ReaLemon
to be different from other brands (thus "differentiated") 16  and in
fact superior to them (thus "successfully differentiated"). Surely
the basic character of the differentiation involved is not the same
in all situations in which consumers perceive differences.
1 7
160Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 59-61 (Aug. 19,
1976), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in TRADE ME. RE. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
161 Id. 59.
162 Id. 60.
163 It suggests, if anything, that ReaLemon's apparently high profits may have
reflected mainly inappropriate accounting treatment of its advertising. If the good-
will Borden acquired in 1962 when it purchased the ReaLemon company was equal
to the depreciated cost of prior advertising, ReaLemon's apparent excess profits
would largely vanish. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
Moreover, unless there was some obstacle preventing Golden Crown and others
from advertising with equal effectiveness, a finding of substantial barriers to entry
would probably be unwarranted. Advertising does appear to have effects on demand,
sometimes creating both brand loyalty and buyer inertia. See J. BAwn, IuNusTmr.L
ORGANIZATrON 260 (2d ed. 1968). But entry barriers are not necessarily high or
even extant simply because prior advertising has had such dynamic effects. See
Schmalensee, Brand Loyalty and Barriers to Entry, 40 S. EcoN. J. 579, 587 (1974).
164 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 77 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in T aDE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
165 Id. 72.
166 Expert testimony defined product differentiation as "a market characteristic
in which buyers do not look at the alternative offerings of various sellers as identical."
Id. 75.
167 Ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, for example, form a class of differentiated
products. But different brands of cereal do appear to differ in ways perceptible by
and important to consumers. See Schmalensee, supra note 51, at 307. Competing
brands of lemon juice, however, are apparently identical. Substantial perceived
differences in the face of actual product homogeneity might imply low quality of
consumer information that Holton suggests leads to gross market imperfections.
Holton, Consumer Behavior, Market Imperfections, and Public Policy, in Irnus-
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Reliance on the historic price premium that ReaLemon's trade-
mark provided as a basis for the conclusion that ReaLemon had
power to exclude competition is also misguided. Any model that
predicts that ReaLemon's trademark would provide substantial
long-run monopoly power must show how possession of that mark
gives the firm a relatively long-lived advantage over its actual and
potential rivals; that is, it must demonstrate an advantage more ex-
pensive for competitors to overcome than for ReaLemon to have
acquired.1 8  A showing that ReaLemon commanded a premium
price over some period does not accomplish this end. Suppose, for
example, that the premium resulted simply from the fact that only
ReaLemon had engaged in non-trivial amounts of advertising. Sup-
pose further that this premium could be erased totally and per-
manently by an advertising outlay of one million dollars spread
over two years. Given these assumptions, it would be difficult to
argue that ReaLemon had a significant, long-run advantage. Simi-
larly, a showing that ReaLemon had lower production costs than
Golden Crown, because of a much more efficient bottling line, would
not suffice to establish the existence of a serious obstacle to effective
competition. In order to prove that such an obstacle existed, one
would also have to show that it somehow would have been unusually
difficult for Golden Crown to have acquired an equally efficient
line.
The ReaLemon mark probably did give its holder a short-run
advantage over Golden Crown and others. The point, however, is
that the existence of this advantage does not establish the presence
of any important long-run advantage that would serve significantly
Or.LT oncAoizATioN & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 102 (1970). On the other hand,
imperfect information does not seem to be a significant problem in the breakfast
cereal market. Although different brands of breakfast cereals appeal to different
segments of the population, there is no segmentation in the lemon juice market. The
leading firms produce many brands of cereal; yet only a very few brands of proc-
essed lemon juice are sold in any one region. Advertising and product development
are much more important in the breakfast cereal industry than in the processed
lemon juice industry.
To lump these product categories, along with others that differ from both in
major ways, under the single heading "differentiated products" is to mistake a call
for analysis for the results thereof. As the comparison of these two industries
indicates, "product differentiation" takes many forms; there is no reason at all to
suppose that they can all be adequately comprehended by any single model. See
Schmalensee, supra note 51, at 307-09.
168 For a similar argument in a related context, see Schmalensee, supra note
163, in which the author argues that brand loyalty to established firms created by
advertising (as opposed to that created by a trademark) does not necessarily yield
a relatively long-lived advantage (such as a significant barrier to entry). The
crucial issues are the ease with which loyalty patterns can be changed and the
degree of expense caused by the change.
[Vol. 12.7:994
ECONOMIC MODELS IN ANTITRUST
to inhibit effective competition. One needs a model that indi-
cates how ReaLemon's advantage was obtained and that sheds some
light on the difficulties, if any, that rivals would face in attempting
to overcome that advantage. Without such a model, it is difficult
to provide an adequate economic argument for mandatory trade-
mark licensing.
169
There are a number of ways in which one might approach the
task of constructing such a model. One might, for example, assert
that "ReaLemon" simply happened to be a name endowed with
certain magical properties in this area, making it impossible for
consumers to resist buying lemon-based products to which that
name was affixed. But Borden's apparent lack of success with prod-
ucts other than reconstituted lemon juice that bore the ReaLemon
name renders this assertion somewhat implausible.
1 70
Similarly, one could argue, as Chamberlin has done,1"t that the
long-run advantage created by a trademark is identical to that cre-
ated by a patent. Trademarks and patents are analytically indis-
tinguishable, he contends, because they both provide monopoly
power. Thus, in order to permit rivals to overcome the trademark
advantage, Chamberlin would allow considerable trademark in-
fringement because it erodes monopoly.1 72 This line of argument
suggests that one should end the trademark protection ReaLemon
169 Because the Initial Decision did not contain an economic model from which
the desirability of trademark licensing was obvious, it is not surprising that the
Opinion of the Commission found this part of the proposed relief unnecessary to
promote competition. Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978, slip op.
at 39 (Nov. 7, 1978). The concurring opinions of Commissioners Clanton, id.
(Opinion of Clanton, Comm'r, concurring, at 5), and Pitofsky, id. (Opinion of
Pitofsky, Comm'r, concurring, at 20), express this same view, although Chairman
Pertschuk argued for "some form of trademark relief," id. (Separate Opinion of
Pertschuk, Comm'r, on the Issue of Relief, at 7). The Commission's result may
reflect appropriate placement of the burden of proof, even though it may not in
fact be the right conclusion here. The Commission adopted, with only slight
modifications, the pricing portion of the relief ordered in the Initial Decision; but
because on this issue the Initial Decision simply says "go and sin no more" without
defining sin very clearly, it is not clear what effect the Commission's order will have
on Borden's behavior, beyond making it more reluctant to lower prices in response
to competition.
17o See Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent
113-15, Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), -'eported in
[1976] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 7 21,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the
Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), -reported in TRmE REc. REa'. (CCH) Adv. Sb.
No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
7-1E. CAAmEkn, THE THEORY Or MoNoPOLisTIc COMPEnTIOx 57-62 (8th
ed., 1962).
172 Chamberlin would favor more extensive use of legislated quality standards
to perform the consumer protection function of trademarks in certain industries.
At most, he would extend trademark protection only for limited periods, of about
five years. Id. 270-74.
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enjoyed here. This reasoning, however, is not entirely persuasive.
Although patents and trademarks share some analogous character-
istics, there are differences between them as well; trademarks per-
form important functions that patents do not. One function of
the trademark is to identify the origin or source of the goods to
which it is affixed. A second and more important function today
is to indicate the quality of the item.'73 But if one accepts the argu-
ment that all trademarks should not be attacked, one must still
construct a model that either singles out ReaLemon for special
treatment or shows why it should not be singled out.
It seems apparent that the "action" in the reconstituted lemon
juice industry is on the demand side; in order to understand the
value of the "ReaLemon" trademark, one must have an appropriate
model of consumer behavior. Some hints about the nature of such
a model are given by documents and testimony cited in the Initial
Decision. A survey of consumer attitudes concluded that consumers
"see ReaLemon as the brand that is proven and reliable and has
captured their brand loyalty." 17- A former ReaLemon regional
sales manager stated, "ReaLemon was first in the business and over
a long period of years they had established a very dominant con-
sumer and trade-wise acceptance." 175 The grocery buyer for the
leading chain in Buffalo noted that ReaLemon was "the product
that customers have used for years, and they are very familiar with
it." 1' Finally, the grocery buyer for a Wisconsin-based chain
generalized, "The first in, that constantly promotes [sic] their own
name themselves, seems to almost create a brand identity in the
consumer's mind that she just can't get out of it." 17 A common
thread running through these and similar statements is that con-
sumers' long experience with ReaLemon had a good deal to do
with that brand's premium status.
There are a number of mechanisms that one might invoke to
link experience to preferences. Studies by Allison and Uhl,178 and
173 Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FoRanAM~ L.
REv. 363, 363-64 (1974).
174 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 62 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported
in TR_.DE EG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
175 Id.
176 Id. 64.
177Id. 64-65.
178 Allison & Uhl, Influence of Beer Brand Identification on Taste Perception,
3. MA R nG RESEARCH, August 1964, at 36 (product quality ratings for unlabelled
beer quite similar; substantial differences in quality ratings when beer was labelled).
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by White, 79 have found that product labelling can affect consumers'
perceptions of product performance. It is somewhat difficult to
reconcile this effect with either broad or narrow definitions of buyer
rationality,8 0 but in any case, it is not obvious that consumers'
perceptions of the qualities of competing brands of processed lemon
juice were distorted in major ways. The study of consumer atti-
tudes cited above ll noted that "no differences were mentioned
between ReaLemon and the other products." 182
A more appealing mechanisms for linking experience to pref-
erence for a product, that is perfectly consistent with consumer
rationality, is suggested by Bauer's interesting discussion of the
risk-taking involved in consumer behavior. 8 3 Bauer notes that any
purchase act has an enormous number of possible consequences,
the relative likelihoods of which cannot be calculated by rational
humans.1 s4  He points out that "brand loyalty," 11-a term that
connotes the strong attachment one has to a brand that has proven
to be satisfactory, and for which one might be willing to pay a
premium price-can be a sensible way of reducing perceived risk.
He provides illustrative anecdotal evidence of stronger loyalty to
particular brands of sugar among housewives who are frequent
bakers and who view the consequences of using an unsatisfactory
sugar as potentially severe, than among housewives in general.
179 1. WH=TE, The Perception of Value in Products, in ON KNOWING THE
CoNsirm 102-03 (J. Newman ed. 1966) (product A perceived as somewhat
superior when products A and B were not labelled; A, somewhat inferior when
products properly labelled).
180 For a discussion of broad definitions of buyer rationality, see Simon,
Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, Am. ECON. REv., May 1976, at 1.
Simon argues that economics should be concerned with rationality in a broader
sense. Besides being concerned with results, rationality in a broader sense would
also consider the effectiveness, in light of human cognitive powers, of the procedures
used to choose the appropriate course of action in the face of complexity and
uncertainty.
181 See note 174 supra & accompanying text.
182Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 62 (Aug. 19, 1976),
modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in ThADE BE. Rn. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
183 Bauer, Consumer Behavior as Risk Taking, in Pnocs nNcs OF TH= 43RD
NATIONAL CoNFmENCE OF =r AmEmcAN MAIKETrNG ASSOCIATION 389 (B.
Hancock ed. June 1960), reprinted in Risic TAXn N AND INFOwMATIoN HANDnaG
IN CoNsrm B vion 23 (D. Cox ed. 1967).
.184For example, can a "bad" bottle of lemon juice kill you? Can it cause
cancer? Can it produce bad breath? How might one attach value or subjective
probabilities to these events?
U5 On the many definitions of "brand loyalty" in various contexts, see J. ENGEL,
R. BLACKwEL & D. KoLrT, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 440-46 (3d ed. 1978) and
references cited therein. In the text of this Article the term "brand loyalty" is
employed in a fashion consistent with the facts in ReaLemon: a loyal consumer is
willing to pay a premium price for the favored brand.
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Subsequently, Cunningham found a strong positive association be-
tween the risk that individuals associated with particular product
classes and the strength of their expressed preference for their
favorite brand in each class."' Roselius found that consumers gen-
erally ranked brand loyalty (that is, buying a favorite brand) well
above a number of other methods of risk-reduction (such as buying
the most expensive brand).,' 7 Sheth and Venkatesan found that
as experience with a product class grew (in an experimental setting),
brand loyalty became the dominant risk-reduction device employed,
while information-seeking and prepurchase deliberation decreased
over time. 8
Not only has the Bauer hypothesis, that perceived risk fosters
loyalty toward a brand with which one has had favorable experi-
ence, withstood direct testing, but it is also consistent with a good
deal of apparently unrelated theory and evidence. It is, in particu-
lar, consistent with hyper-rational consumer behavior of the sort
usually assumed by economists.8 9 The Appendix to this Article
sketches a very simple model, in which buyers know the laws of
probability and properly compute the relevant expectations, that
predicts brand loyalty as a consequence of uncertain product per-
formance. In that model, rational consumers who have had experi-
ence with the first brand of a particular type may decide not even
to try a second brand introduced at the same (or even a somewhat
lower) price and of equal ex ante attractiveness. Once the first
brand has been used, continuing to buy it involves less risk than
trying a new brand; thus, trial will occur only if the expected gains
are sufficiently large. In the model in the Appendix, the first brand
on the market obtains a lasting advantage, whose magnitude in-
creases the more averse consumers are to the risks involved.
On the empirical side, one can point to the recent study by
Bond and Lean for the Federal Trade Commission of two drug
markets.' 90 It concluded that "strong preferences are revealed for
186 Cunningham, Perceived Risk and Brand Loyalty, in Rrsx TAKING AND
INFORmAmON HANDrNG N CONS MmR BmAVIOR 507 (D. Cox ed. 1967).
187 Roselius, Consumer Rankings of Risk Reduction Methods, 35 J. MAmETiNG
56 (1971).
188 Sheth & Venkatesan, Risk-Reductioti Processes in Repetitive Consumer
Behavior, 5 J. MAmETmNG REsEARcH 307 (1968). Taylor provides an overview
of the marketing literature concerned with the risk-taking dimension of consumer
behavior. Taylor, The Role of Risk in Consumer Behavior, 38 J. MAmm TNG 54
(1974).
189 See J. HISHEI FER, IICE TnEoRT AND APPLICATIONS 77 (1976); E.
MANsFIELD, ECONOICS 394 (1974).
1 9 0 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON SA/.,ws, PROMOTION, AND
PRODUCT DIFFuRENTiATION IN Two PRESCRpTION DRUG MAR=ETs 76 (1977) (study
by Bond & Lean).
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brands that are the first of their kind to appear on the market.
These preferences wane only slowly over time. . . . [P]hysicians
can be persuaded to prescribe late-entering brands if those brands
offer some therapeutice gain useful to a subset of patients." 191 The
authors noted that these first-brand preferences could not be ex-
plained by differences in advertising or promotional spending. In
light of the risk that physicians associate, at least subjectively, with
prescribing a new drug, and their insensitivity to drug prices, this
form of brand loyalty is easily explained as risk-reducing be-
havior.192 Buzzell and Farris found somewhat weaker evidence of
early-brand advantages (and late-brand disadvantages) in marketing
costs across a wide range of consumer goods.193 Peckham expressed
the conventional wisdom, consistent with the quotation above, that
it is much more difficult to market an imitative ("me-too") brand
than one that differs from others already being sold. 94 In experi-
ments with neutrally-labeled (for example, "Brand H") but physi-
cally identical brands of bread, Tucker 195 found that subjects were
willing to pay a premium to continue consuming brands with which
they had acquired experience. McConnell made the same findings
with respect to beer.196 The parallel with the processed lemon
juice market is apparent, as is the broad consistency of such be-
havior with a risk-avoidance model.
The above discussion at least suggests that the main reason
that consumers were willing to pay a premium for the ReaLemon
name was that they had had greater experience with ReaLemon
than with other brands. Those other brands were rationally (at
least in the broad sense in which this term is used outside economics)
viewed as riskier alternatives. This is almost certainly an incom-
191 Id.
192 This effect may be exceptionally important in prescription drug markets
because price in those markets is largely removed from the selection decision. The
selecting physician is not concerned with price because he does not pay for the
product; therefore, reducing risk becomes relatively more important to him.
19
3 Buzzell & Farris, Marketing Costs in Consumer Goods Industries, MARKET-
INC ScI. INST. REPORT No. 76-111, 1976, at 20.
19Peckham, Can We Relate Advertising Dollars to Market Share Objectives?,
in ADvERTISING RESEARCH FOUNDATON PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH ANuAL CoN-
FERENcE (1966).
195 Tucker, The Development of Brand Loyalty, J. MAamTIN RESEARcH,
August 1964, at 32. Four identical loaves of bread with neutral labels were used,
but as a consumer consistently selected one brand, a penny was attached to the
non-favored brands. Most consumers remained with that brand for a time despite
the difference in price; switching occurred only after the difference had become
significant.
196 McConnell, The Development of Brand Loyalty: An Experimental Study,
5 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 13 (1968).
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plete model of consumer behavior in this market; 197 but all models
of reality, by definition, are incomplete. The real issue is whether
the assumptions or predictions of the risk-avoidance model are in-
consistent with the facts of the case. That issue cannot be defini-
tively settled here. Had the judge in ReaLemon explicitly con-
sidered alternative models of the source of the value of the
"ReaLemon" trademark, more relevant information, might now be
available.
In any event, assume that this framework is correct; it is ap-
propriate, then, to consider some of its implications. As argued
above, 198 what matters is not the price premium that buyers are
willing to pay for ReaLemon at any instant, but rather the difficulty
that an entrant would have in eroding it. The risk-avoidance model
suggests that the first brand's advantage over later "me-too" entrants
would last for a relatively long time; but it does not establish the
magnitude of that advantage. 199
One might conjecture, for example, that processed lemon
juice purchases are not viewed as particularly risky by consumers,
so the advantage should be small. But this conclusion is not obvi-
ous: because lemon juice is often used as an ingredient in various
dishes, a bad bottle of lemon juice could ruin an expensive meal
prepared for important guests. Robertson reports that in at least
one small sample, food purchases were rated only slightly (and in-
significantly) less risky than purchases of clothing or appliances.200
Even if one accepts the view that the average perceived risk at
any instant is measured by the ReaLemon price premium, which
historically has been substantial compared to the cost of a bottle
of lemon juice, there still remains the question of how easily that
premium could be eroded. Demsetz' study of frozen orange juice,
for example, indicated that buyer experience with low-priced brands
-9 This model ignores the likelihood that habitual purchase of ReaLemon will
be questioned only if the consumer receives a sufficiently convincing indication that
another brand might be better. That is, it is probably unrealistic to portray
consumers, as the foregoing discussion has implicitly done, as constantly comparing
available alternatives on the margin. Habit serves to shorten decisionmaking time
and effort; once established, it may persist in the absence of strong stimuli. See
Bauer, supra note 183, at 391, reprinted in RISK TAXING AND INFORMATION
HAING IN CoNsUmm BEHAVIOR 23, 25 (D. Cox ed. 1967). The risk reduction
model also ignores the role that ReaLemon's advertising might have played and the
possibility that ReaLemon's premium price served as an indicator of quality, re-
inforcing its premium status. See J. ENGEL, R. BLAcK'wELL & D. KOLLAT, supra
note 185, at 251-52, and references cited therein.
198 See text accompanying notes 160-69 supra.
-199 See generally R. HOLTON, supra note 167.
200T. ROBERTSON, The Effect of the Informal Group upon Member Innovative
Behavior, in PEsnSECws IN CoNsUMER BE-HAViOR 342 (rev. ed. 1973).
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rather rapidly eroded loyalty to premium-priced national brands
of that product.201 Although one might infer a similar ease of
erosion in this case, the long period of ReaLemon's dominance
makes that inference suspect. On the other hand, the rapid rise
in Golden Crown's share, coupled with its purchase by Seven-Up,
points toward erosion, especially because it appears that Golden
Crown managed to make substantial inroads with a reasonably mod-
est investment. But this does not really settle the matter. It would
be useful to know how the premium that ReaLemon commanded
varied with consumer experience with Golden Crown. If it were
totally erased by one purchase of Golden Crown, and if Golden
Crown could obtain trial of its product at relatively little cost, then
ReaLemon's long-run advantage would be minimal. On the other
hand, if ReaLemon's premium was not materially lessened in re-
gions in which Golden Crown attained a large share, or if detailed
studies showed that years of using Golden Crown were required to
erase preference for ReaLemon at identical prices, ReaLemon's
advantage would be substantial. In any event, empirical work re-
lating the strength of loyalty to ReaLemon to the penetration of
Golden Crown could have calibrated the risk-avoidance model by
indicating the real, long-run importance of ReaLemon's advantage;
but apparently no such work was prepared for the Federal Trade
Commission proceeding.
Thus, we are left with only the main qualitative implication
of the risk-avoidance model: consumers' experience with ReaLemon
gives that brand some long-lived advantage. This implication sup-
ports the Initial Decision's conclusion that the "ReaLemon" trade-
mark was at the heart of the firm's long-run monopoly power,202
but it fails to clarify the source of that power and the trademark's
value. Furthermore, because the risk attached by buyers to Golden
Crown and to other "low-priced" brands reflects ignorance of the
homogeneity of all brands of bottled reconstituted lemon juice,
203
there is a clear market failure of the sort economists are used to
dealing with.
20 4
2 ol Demsetz, The Effect of Consumer Experience on Brand Loyalty and the
Structure of Market Demand, 30 ECONOuMTICA 22 (1962).
202 See text accompanying note 157 supra.
203 If the source of ReaLemon's premium brand status lay in consumer per-
ceptions that it tasted better than other brands, it could be argued that the problem
was irrationality, not ignorance. If consumers are irrational in any deep sense, the
welfare-economic case for competition breaks down.
204 Holton would describe the problem as low quality of consumer demand.
He suggests that such problems might be alleviated through the use of more
efficient information (information that allows more ready comparison among brands),
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The usual prescription for ignorance is to provide informa-
tion.20 In seeking to persuade customers to try its product, Golden
Crown was, among other things, attempting to provide information.
If one accepts the finding that ReaLemon acted unreasonably and
illegally in ways that were harmful to Golden Crown, it follows
that ReaLemon was hindering the provision of information in an
unacceptable fashion. If one concludes, as the judge did, that a
cease and desist order probably would not have prevented
ReaLemon from continuing to hinder the flow of information,26
it is logical to consider requiring the provision of information, if
this can be done at moderate cost. One might, for example, re-
quire Borden to finance advertising to the effect that all brands of
reconstituted lemon juice are chemically identical. But, unless
quality standards 207 are imposed on all producers of reconstituted
lemon juice by the Federal Trade Commission or some other en-
tity, this "information" might in fact be misleading. Moreover,
consumers do not have infinite capacity for information processing.
The more easily information can be understood and employed, the
more likely it is to affect decisions.
20 8
Because a trademark provides a good deal of information
quickly to one who has experience with it, one can argue that the
of quality standards, and of advertising with certain minimum disclosures. See
R. HOLTON, supra note 167.
Holton cites four conditions under which information about a specific product
can be expected to be quite complete. They are: (1) the item is bought frequently
by the specific buyer; (2) the quality and performance characteristics of the product
are known to the buyer prior to purchase or are quickly ascertained after the item
has been used; (3) the rate of technological change in the product is slow relative
to the frequency of purchase; and (4) the terms of competing sellers' offers are
known and are stable over time. Id. 104-05. Bottled lemon juice satisfies each of
these conditions.
205 See id.; Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. PoLiTicAL
EcoN. 311 (1970).
206 The Commission subsequently rejected this conclusion. See note 169 supra.
2 07 Holton suggests that the imposition of quality standards leads to better
consumer information, because such standards are a readily usable substitute for
the detailed information-gathering and comparison in which consumers might
otherwise engage. For example, a product might be required to contain a certain
minimum percentage of lemon oil in order to be labelled "reconstituted lemon
juice." Such a label can readily convey to consumers information about the
identity of various brands (such as information about their contents) and at the
same time assure them that the products are comparable. R. HoLTON, supra note
167, at 115.
208 Id. 113; Simon, supra note 180, at 13-14. Holton remarks that consumers
continue to search for information as long as the marginal cost of the search does not
exceed the expected marginal return from further searching effort. He suggests the
need not so much for more information, but rather, for more efficient information.
Information provided in a form that permits easy, efficient comparison of price and
quality would reduce the incremental cost of search; consequently, more search
would be undertaken.
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trademark licensing relief ordered in the Initial Decision,20 9 with
the associated quality control provisions, was an efficient way to
transmit information to consumers. The lack of this information
is at the root of the apparent market failure in that case. Thus,
if the obstacles to effective competition in ReaLemon were such
that a cease and desist order was inadequate, the trademark licens-
ing relief actually ordered in the Initial Decision (which had sen-
sible quality control provisions) probably would have improved
market performance as well as deterred other potential predators.
However, one cannot make an adequate economic argument, either
for the inadequacy of a cease and desist order or for the desirability
of trademark licensing, simply by asserting that, "[t]he heart of the
monopoly power preserved and maintained by respondent Borden
lies in the ReaLemon trademark and its dominant market posi-
tion." 210 A careful selection and examination of an economic
model appropriate to the situation involved is required.
211
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Through an examination of the major issues in a recent case,
this Article has attempted to shed some light on the appropriate
use of economic analysis in antitrust. By now it should be clear
that it is logically impossible to avoid selecting an appropriate
economic model, or appropriate models. If model selection is not
done explicitly, the model employed in any particular decision or
analysis emerges as that model or class of models that supports the
conclusions reached. In situations in which the appropriate eco-
nomic model is not obvious-and these can hardly be uncommon-
failure explicitly to face the selection problem makes error more
likely.
Section III showed that the importance attached to the market
definition/market share exercise in ReaLemon reflected the im-
209 Borden, Inc. (Initial Decision), No. 8978, slip op. at 167-70 (Aug. 19,
1976), modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 8978 (Nov. 7, 1978),
reported in TRADE REG. BEP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8 (Nov. 27, 1978).
210 Id. 164.
211 Although trademarks are also important in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal
industry, a comparison of the analysis here with that in Schmalensee, supra note 51,
should serve to indicate that they play very different roles in the two industries.
In the cereal industry, brand introduction is a major form of competition and an
integral part of an effective mechanism for deterring potential entrants. Licensing
trademarks would facilitate entry by enhancing the ability of small producers to
compete on the basis of price. Thus, defensible economic arguments for trademark
licensing in these industries differ in basic ways.
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plicit selection of a restrictive class of models. The debate sur-
rounding the definition of "the relevant market" served to illustrate
the difficulty of bending those models to fit the facts in this case.
At best, such exercises can give some information on short-run mo-
nopoly power, but better and more reliable information may be
obtained through analysis of profitability. Moreover, market defini-
tion-market share exercises can shed no light at all on long-run
monopoly power-the power to prevent the erosion of profits through
more intense rivalry-unless one adopts a particularly limited form
of the "size is power" model,212 which is difficult to defend.
Section IV considered appropriate tests for predatory pricing,
both in general and in the context of ReaLemon. The apparently
simple rules proposed in recent years by several authors are not in
fact simple to apply to cases such as ReaLemon. Moreover, they
are either derived from welfare-economic arguments with internal
problems, or from economic models that cannot claim universal
applicability. Because selection of a per se test for predatory pric-
ing amounts to a judgment that the economic model from which it
was derived is applicable to the case at hand, and because no models
that yield simple, universally applicable tests are available, the cur-
rent choice of a general policy in this area must be between a "hands
off" approach and a "rule of reason" analysis. Moreover, as the
discussion of ReaLemon indicated these two choices could be sensi-
bly joined by establishing a rule that observed pricing practices are
strongly presumed innocent until an examination of the facts in-
volved proves otherwise.
Section V considered the relief ordered in the Initial Decision
in ReaLemon. That relief was intended to change the industry's
performance by altering an important element of industry structure.
Such relief must logically derive from an economic model of the
situation considered because a prediction of improved performance
clearly cannot be based on facts alone. An illustrative analysis of
the role of the "ReaLemon" trademark was offered that tended to
provide support for the trademark licensing relief ordered. But it
is important to note that no such analysis was articulated in the
Initial Decision; the decision to attack ReaLemon's trademark was
apparently based on little more than observation of its widespread
acceptance and apparent, short-run competitive importance.
212 See P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 205-17 (relevant market and market share),
669-73 (predatory pricing), 190-94 (relief in monopolization cases). It is not clear
why market share would be an appropriate measure of size even under models of
this sort; surely total assets or total liquid assets would be more relevant when
predation is an issue.
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The point of focusing on ReaLemon was not to show that the
Initial Decision was wrong or incompetent by prevailing standards.
On the contrary, the administrative law judge dealt with the issues
before him competently, though in relatively standard ways. This
fact, along with the inherent interest of the main issues in the case,
permitted the sort of critical analysis attempted here. The goal
was neither to attack nor to defend the Initial Decision, but rather
to focus attention on the ways in which antitrust cases have tradi-
tionally been decided. 213 The ReaLemon case may involve more
complex economic issues than do many other cases, but it seems
unlikely that it is truly exceptional in this regard. If reliance on
the implications of a set of economic models that were never ex-
plicitly evaluated in light of the facts at hand led to problems in
ReaLemon, this same standard approach would probably produce
inadequate analysis in other cases as well. If antitrust law is to
become a more consistent force for economic efficiency, the selec-
tion and analysis of appropriate economic models must be more
frequently incorporated into antitrust proceedings. This objective
requires more use of the tools of economic theory as these tools are
used by modern economists. The result may well be to alter the
tasks and roles of both lawyers and economists in antitrust liti-
gation.
APPENDIX: RATIONAL BRAND LOYALTY
Suppose that a new product, R, which is apparently different
from anything else on the market, is developed and introduced at
price P. Buyers do not know how much a unit of R will be worth
to them until they have tried it. For simplicity, it is assumed that
R is an "experience" good: 214 no information about its quality can
be ascertained prior to purchase, but complete information is pro-
vided by a single trial. Let us assume that R's "value" can be
measured in dollar terms. Before each individual has tried the
product, his subjective distribution of its value to him is assumed
for simplicity to be uniform between zero and X. It is also
assumed that this is the correct distribution on average. That is,
the objective distribution of actual values of R across members of
213 Of course, these remarks apply as well to the subsequent opinions in
ReaLemon of the Federal Trade Commission and of individual commissioners,
which are also discussed in this Article.
214 There are two ways in which a consumer can obtain information about a
product's quality: by searching before purchase or by experience with a product
after purchase. Experience is often relied upon heavily when the purchase price is
low enough so that any moderately expensive search procedure is not practical.
See Nelson, supra note 205, at 311.
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the population is also uniform between zero and X. Another way
of looking at this is to suppose that each individual knows the dis-
tribution of values for the population as a whole but is completely
ignorant as to where his own experience will place him in that
distribution. A consumer might know, for example, that R is
worth at least ten dollars to ten percent of the population but have
no idea before trying it whether he will fall in that ten percent. (A
very large population is assumed throughout, so that the distribu-
tions can be treated as continuous.) Let x be the actual value of R
experienced by a typical buyer.
Let us initially assume risk-neutrality.21 5 Then as long as the
random variable (x' - P)216 has a non-negative expectation-that is,
the expected value of R is at least equal to the price of R, all con-
sumers will try R once. If we define a by P/X - 1 - a, then trial
by all will occur as long as a > -, and a fraction a of the popula-
tion will continue purchasing R after having tried it.
Now let a second product, G, be introduced. It is clear to all
that G and R are members of the same product class, such as bot-
tled reconstituted lemon juice, or freeze-dried instant coffee. There
is no visible claim that G has attributes that R lacks, or that it
lacks any of R's characteristics. In marketing terminology, G is a
"me-too" product. Buyers thus view their choices as G, R, or
neither; there is no point in buying both G and R. Suppose the
price of G is also set at P and that, unknown to consumers in ad-
vance, G and R are in fact identical.
In one extreme case, consumers might simply assume that, in
the absence of any apparent differences, G and R are identical.
They would thus assume that their experience with R applies per-
fectly to G. Because the products, by assumption, sell for the same
price, each can expect to capture half of total sales. But this is
surely a very extreme case; one must doubt that consumers always
assume in the absence of any information to the contrary that all
products in the same narrow product class are identical. Some
generalization of this sort probably occurs, of course. That is, con-
sumers who have tried R are likely to act as if they knew more
about G than if they had never seen any product in the relevant class
before. But as long as there exists some residual uncertainty about
215 Risk neutrality means that one has neither a liking for nor an aversion to
taking risk. Thus, the decision of a risk-neutral person to purchase a new product
is not affected by the fact that there is risk in trying it. Such a consumer is only
concerned with the average or expected level of product quality.
216 Throughout this appendix, random variables are indicated with the symbol
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the worth of G even among those who have tried R, some light
may be shed on consumer behavior by considering the polar case
of no generalization.
Let us examine that case, still assuming risk-neutrality. As-
sume that each consumer takes the worth of G to him, call it y', as
a random variable uniformly distributed between zero and X, re-
gardless of his experience with R. Thus G is felt to be exactly as
risky, ex ante, as R was. (This is an extreme case, of course; one
might expect high experienced x to imply high expected y, since
individuals' tastes are the stochastic element here.) On these as-
sumptions, the fraction (1 -a) of consumers who tried R and then
decided not to buy it will also try G and, since the products are
identical, reject it. The remaining 100a% of the population is al-
ready buying R. These individuals face a choice between continu-
ing to purchase R, thereby receiving each time for sure a net bene-
fit of (x - P), or trying G. Ex ante, each consumer assigns some
probability to the event that G is better for him than R; trial of G
essentially buys him the option of switching to the better product
if this event occurs.
We can ignore the cost stream associated with the individual's
purchase sequence, because it will be identical whether or not G
is tried or selected. Let (1 + r)-1 be the discount factor applied to
benefits generated by successive purchases. Let f(y) and F(y) be,
respectively, the density and distribution functions of the random
variable y', which is the value of G to a typical consumer. Then a
consumer purchasing R and receiving "value" x will elect not to
try G if and only if the following inequality is satisfied:
X
(Al) x[(l + r)/r] fyf(y)dy + F(x)x(1/r) +
0
(l/r)[l - F(x)]fy[ f ) ]
The term on the left is the capitalized value of benefits from re-
maining with R indefinitely. The first term on the right is the
expected gain from the initial trial of G. The second term is the
probability that y' is revealed to be no greater than x, times the
capitalized benefit from returning to R after trying G once. The
third term is the probability that y' exceeds x, times the capitalized
expected value of y', conditional on its exceeding x.
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Under the assumption of a uniform distribution, f(y) = 1/X,
and F(X) = x/X, for 0 < y < X. Substituting into (Al), integrat-
ing, and collecting and simplifying terms, one finds that the condi-
tion for not trying G at all becomes
(A2) (x/X)2 - 2r(x/X)(l+r)+(l+r) < 0.
It is easy to show that as long as r is positive, this inequality will be
satisfied for x sufficiently close to X. Customers who are very satis-
fied with R, in the sense that they attach sufficiently low probability
to the existence of a better brand, rationally decide not to try G,
even though they attach no disutility to the risk involved in such a
trial. In other words, a consumer will not even try G if he is very
satisfied with R. Solving (A2), and focusing on the relevant root,
one obtains the fraction, y, of the population that does not try G as
(A) y= Vr(l+r) - r.
If r =- .01, about nine percent of the total population does not try
G, while for r = .10, y = .23. If the two products are identical,
and if consumers who have tried both divide their purchases evenly,
R sells to a fraction (a+y)/2 of the population, while G sells to
(a - y)/2.2 17 Thus, the fraction of the population buying R ex-
ceeds that buying G by y.
In this model, G and R are identical and are recognized as such
by all who try both. They sell at the same price, and before trial
they are viewed as equally risky. Yet the first brand on the market
obtains a lasting advantage. In this setup, G could induce more
trial by lowering its price. If the price decrease were perceived
as temporary, however, it might have to be quite large in order to
have a significant impact, because it would, in effect, only increase
the first term on the right of (Al), which represents the expected
value of the initial trial of G. On the other hand, because G and R
are by assumption identical, one might expect R's advantage to
erode over time, if only through word-of-mouth communication
between those who initially tried G and those who decided not to
do so.
It is of some interest to see what happens if the two products
are not identical. Again, a simple polar case is of some illustrative
value. Suppose now that for the population as a whole, the true
values of x and y are independently, identically, and uniformly
distributed over the range [O,X]. That is, information about one
217 This will hold true as long as it is assumed that each member of the
population will purchase exactly once during the period.
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reveals nothing about the other. It is now possible for an individual
to value R highly and not care at all for G, or vice versa. This
means that consumers' expectation that the distribution of y' is in-
dependent of their experienced x is now correct. Then it is rela-
tively straightforward to show that the first brand's advantage is
still present, though it is smaller.
Of the fraction (1 - a) of the population that tried R and de-
cided not to buy it, a fraction a will decide to buy G when they try it,
since that is the probability that the y experienced exceeds P. A
fraction y will remain with R and not try G, as before. If a con-
sumer is buying R and receiving value x, the probability that try-
ing G will induce a shift to that brand because y > x is (1 - x/X).
Then the fraction of the population that switches to G is given by
(I - Y)X
(A4) f (1 - x/X)(l/X)dx = - 2/2.
P
(The fraction of the population that could switch is (a-y), so that
G captures a fraction (a-y)/2 of them.) Adding things up, one finds
that the fractions of the population to which each brand sells are
as follows:
G: a- +y2)12, R: a - (a y2)/2.
The fraction of the population buying R exceeds that buying G
by y2; the difference was y in the case in which the brands were
identical. Note that when expectations are correct, G's entry causes
the total fraction buying to rise from a to a(2 - a). In spite of this,
G's sales can be less than half R's pre-entry sales if y2 exceeds
a(l -a).
Thus, in this example of "true" differentiation, the first brand
in the market again has an advantage over the second. The ad-
vantage is smaller (y2 compared to y), but there is now less reason
to expect its erosion. Though G and R are of equal value on aver-
age, consumers initially electing not to try G will receive conflicting
reports of its relative quality from those who have tried both.
A second interesting extension of the basic model is to allow
consumers to be averse to risk.2 18 Risk-aversion increases the
strength of the effect found above; a risk-averter purchasing R
will be less likely than a risk-neutral individual to try G, if all else
remains equal. To capture the effects of risk-aversion, suppose that
218 If a person is risk averse, he must expect an extra benefit from G before he
will try it, because of the risk associated with trying a new product.
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the dollar value of the net gain from consuming R or G at price P
is given by U(z), where z = x if R is purchased, and z = y if G
is bought instead, with U a strictly concave, increasing function.
If an individual finds R to be worth x and is purchasing R, a
slight generalization of equation (Al) indicates that this individual
will try G if and only if the following inequality holds:
X X
(A5) Tu(x) - r f U(y)f(y)dy + [1-F(x)] S U(y)fx(y)dy
0 x
- [1l+r-F(x)]U(x) > 0,
where f,(y) = f(y)[1-F(x)], x < y X.
If the consumer were risk-neutral, the test inequality would
be simply:
(A6) T(x) - ry + [1-F(x)]yx - [1+r-F(x)]x > 0,
X X
where y - Syf(y)dy, and Yx = fyfx(y)dy •
0 X
Recalling that x is some particular constant for each consumer,
one can re-scale U without loss of generality for any particular con-
sumer so that U(x) = x. Exploiting the concavity of U, we have
T,(x) < rU(y) + [1-F(x)]U(Y) - [1+r-F(x)]x
< r[x + U, (x)(y- x)] + [1-F(x)][x + U'(x)(yx - x)]
-[I+r-F(x)]x - U'(x)T(x).
Thus, if T(x) is negative, so that a risk-neutral individual experi-
encing value x from brand R would not try G, a risk-averse indi-
vidual with the same experience and the same expectations about
G's value will not try it either, because if T(x) is negative, T,(x)
will also be negative. Moreover, if T(x) is positive but sufficiently
small, Tu(x) will be negative; risk-aversion will cause some indi-
viduals who would have tried G rationally to decide not to do so.
It should be clear from this latter proof, which did not require any
assumptions about the shape of f(y), that the earlier use of uniform
and identical distributions merely served to simplify exposition; the
qualitative results did not depend on the shapes of the distributions
involved.
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